



CITIZENS AND THEIR COMMUNITIES: Civic engagement, activism and volunteering in the Republic of Macedonia



CITIZENS AND THEIR COMMUNITIES: Civic engagement, activism and volunteering in the Republic of Macedonia

SKOPJE, 2016

This publication was made possible through the generous support of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), within the USAID Civil Society Project. The contents are the responsibility of the Foundation Open Society - Macedonia and Reactor - Research in Action and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government

Citizens and their communities:

Civic engagement, activism and volunteering in the Republic of Macedonia

Publisher:

Reactor–Research in action

For the publisher:

Damjan Zdravev

Authors:

Vaska Leshoska

Tanja Maleska

Jana Korunovska Srbijanko

Neda Korunovska

Damjan Zdravev

Filip Dimchevski

Blazen Maleski

Translation:

Ana Vasileva

Design:

Brigada

Print:

Pro point

Circulation: 100

Free/Non-commercial Copy

ISBN 978-608-4684-16-9

CIP – Каталогизација во публикација

Национална и универзитетска библиотека „Св. Климент Охридски“, Скопје

323.269(497.7)(047)

CITIZENS and their communities : civic engagement, activism and volunteering in the Republic of Macedonia / [authors Vaska Leshoska ... и др.]. – Skopje : Reactor – Research in action, 2016. – 95 стр.

: табели ; 25 см Фусноти кон текстот. – Автори: Vaska Leshoska, Tanja Maleska, Jana Korunovska Srbijanko, Neda Korunovska, Damjan Zdravev, Filip Dimchevski, Blazen Maleski. – Библиографија: стр. 90–93

ISBN 978-608-4684-19-0

а) Граѓански активизам – Македонија – Извештаи

COBISS.MK-ID 102311434

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUMMARY	5
Citizens and their communities	5
Attitudes towards civic engagement	6
Civic participation in Macedonia: Initiatives for the common good	6
Civic engagement in Macedonia: Activism	7
Conventional civic engagement in Macedonia: voting at elections.....	7
Civic engagement in Macedonia: Volunteering	7
Predicting civic activism and engagement in civic initiatives.....	8
INTRODUCTION	9
ENGAGEMENT IN PUBLIC POLICIES AND SCIENTIFIC LITERATURE: INDICATORS OF CIVIC ENGAGEMENT	9
CIVIC ENGAGEMENT MODELS.....	9
CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND YOUTH	12
CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN THE COUNTRIES OF MIDDLE AND EAST EUROPE: COMMUNISM AND TRANSITION TO PLURAL DEMOCRACIES.....	13
CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN MACEDONIA	14
OPERATIONALIZATION (MEASURABILITY) OF CIVIL ENGAGEMENT AND VOLUNTEERING	17
PROCEDURE AND SAMPLE	17
Demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the sample from 2012	18
Demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the sample from 2013	19
Demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the sample from 2014.....	20
Demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the sample from 2015	21
Demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the sample from 2016.....	21
CITIZENS AND THEIR COMMUNITIES: ATTITUDES TOWARDS THEIR NEIGHBORS, SENSE OF BELONGING, SATISFACTION WITH THE PLACE OF RESIDENCE	24
TRUST IN THE NEIGHBORS CYNICISM	24
Construction of the aggregate indicator “benevolence of neighbors”	27
SENSE OF BELONGING TO A COMMUNITY	30
Construction of the indicator “sense of belonging to the community”	34
SATISFACTION WITH THE PLACE OF RESIDENCE AND THE WORK OF THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES	36
SATISFACTION WITH THE PLACE OF RESIDENCE	36
Construction of the indicator “satisfaction with the place of residence”	40

SATISFACTION WITH THE WORK OF THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND ASSESSMENT OF THE CHANGES IN THE COMMUNITIES	42
Construction of the indicator “evaluating the changes in one’s place of residence”	47
TENDENCY FOR MIGRATION OUTSIDE THE PLACE OF RESIDENCE	50
ATTITUDES ABOUT CIVIC ACTIVITY WITHIN THE COMMUNITIES: CONFIDENCE IN THE POSSIBILITY TO INFLUENCE, THE IMPORTANCE OF THE POSSIBILITY TO INFLUENCE AND PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY	54
CONFIDENCE IN THE POSSIBILITY TO INFLUENCE	54
Construction of the indicator “trust in one’s own power to influence”	58
IMPROVING SOCIETY AS A PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY, THE IMPORTANCE OF THE POSSIBILITY TO INFLUENCE AND INCREASED INVOLVEMENT	60
Construction of the indicator “will for involvement”	64
THE SITUATION WITH CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN MACEDONIA: INITIATIVES, ACTIVISM AND CONVENTIONAL CITIZENSHIP	66
INFLUENCE OF THE COMMUNITY: CIVIC ACTIVISM IN THE LIGHT OF CIVIC ENGAGEMENT OF NEIGHBORS AND FELLOW-CITIZENS	66
Construction of the indicator “community organization for civic initiatives”	70
CIVIC INITIATIVES FOR COMMUNITY IMPROVEMENT AND THE COMMON GOOD.....	72
CIVIC ACTIVISM IN THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA.....	76
Construction of the indicators for civic activism.....	78
THE RELATIONS AMONG THE VARIOUS TYPES OF CIVIC ACTIVISM AND THE DIFFERENCES AMONG THE VARIOUS SUBGROUPS OF CITIZENS.....	79
CONVENTIONAL CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA: VOTING AT THE ELECTIONS.....	84
VOLUNTEERING IN THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA	90
PREDICTING THE ENGAGEMENT IN CIVIC INITIATIVES AND CIVIC ACTIVISM	98
Predicting engagement in civic initiatives.....	98
Predicting contact activism	100
Predicting constructive activism	102
Predicting hostile activism	104
Conclusions	108
BIBLIOGRAPHY	111

This study looks at civic engagement in the Republic of Macedonia in the period from 2012 to 2016 among the population of prime working age from 16 to 66. It focuses on civic engagement from four different aspects. Firstly, it focuses on engagement in civic initiatives for the common good, i.e. citizens working together on actions aimed at improving communities. The second aspect is the aspect of civic activism, i.e. the attempts to solve various social problems in collaboration with the authorities, or by engaging in public hearings, working groups, civil protests, petitions and by submitting complaints and proposals. Thirdly, it looks at conventional civic engagement, i.e. voting in parliamentary, local and presidential elections. And finally, it looks at volunteering, i.e., providing unpaid help to individuals and organizations. Apart from examining civic engagement from these four aspects, the study also looked at attitudes that are relevant for predicting civic engagement, such as citizens' attitudes towards the possibilities for civic engagement and participation as well as attitudes towards their communities. In addition, the study also shows how citizens with various demographic backgrounds differ based on all the previously mentioned aspects.

Citizens and their communities

In the period between 2012 and 2016, an average of 44.4% of citizens were convinced that their fellow-citizens act in solidarity and that they help each other constantly, while slightly less than half of citizens (48.12% on average) said that their neighbors can be trusted. However, a large number of the citizens aged 16 to 66 are more cynical and believe that neighbors rarely help each other (46.5%) and believe that given the chance, their neighbors would take advantage of them (on average 51.8%).

The findings lead to the conclusion that more than half of the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia feel a strong sense of belonging to their local communities and the country in which they live. Community belonging was highest in 2012, while in the period until 2015, we can trace a significant linear trend of decline in the sense of belonging to Macedonia and the immediate neighborhoods/residential areas. In 2012, 75.5% of the citizens felt a strong sense of belonging to Macedonia, but in 2016 this percentage dropped to 63.3%. On average, the citizens felt a stronger sense of belonging to Macedonia, compared to their immediate communities – the cities or villages that they live in.

Although the citizens mainly identify with their country, the percentage of citizens who are very satisfied with Macedonia is lower than the percentage of citizens who are very satisfied with their towns and villages and immediate neighborhoods and residential areas in the course of all the years of research. The average assessment of citizens' satisfaction with Macedonia does not change significantly in the period between 2013 and 2016 and most of the citizens, or four out of ten, are partially satisfied with their country. On the other hand, the satisfaction with their immediate communities significantly drops after 2012. In 2012, 19.3% were somewhat satisfied or not satisfied with their towns (cities) at all, while in 2016 every fourth citizen (24.8%) gave one of the two answers implying dissatisfaction.

The citizens' satisfaction with the work of the local authorities is dramatically lower in comparison to the satisfaction with their places of residence. In 2012, the number of very satisfied citizens was lower than one fifth, while in 2015, only 11.1% said they were very satisfied. On the other hand, in the period until 2014, the number of people dissatisfied with the local authorities reached nearly half of all the

citizens aged 16 to 66 (46% in 2012 and 2013, and 48% in 2014), while in 2015 it increased to more than fifty percent (54.5%).

Although during all of the years of research, two out of three citizens on average said that they plan to stay where they were living, the probability for the answer which expresses intent for migration abroad grows linearly in the period between 2013 and 2016. In 2013, one in five citizens said that she/he planned to move, but in 2015 and 2016, more than a quarter of the citizens planned to move out of Macedonia.

Attitudes towards civic engagement

In the period from 2012 to 2016, more than half of the citizens aged 16 to 66 were convinced that they were unable to have any impact whatsoever in the decisions of their municipality, while every fifth citizen believed that he/she could have very little impact. This adds up to three out every four citizens who believe that they cannot have any, or can have very little influence. The citizens' confidence in their power to influence is most detrimental when it comes to decisions affecting their country. Most of them, or based on the average from all the years of research, two out of three (68.2%) are convinced that they are completely unable to influence the decisions made about Macedonia, while every tenth citizen believed that she/he can change very little. In fact, in the period between 2012 and 2016 an average of 83.94% of the citizens aged 16 to 66 believed that they can have very little, or no impact at all on the decisions made on a national level. The average assessment of the possibility to affect the national changes does not change significantly and leads to the conclusion that in the period 2012–2016 most of the citizens felt politically powerless.

Despite the low assessment of their own power to act, in the period between 2012 and 2016, the majority of citizens of the Republic of Macedonia felt personal responsibility to improve society (an average of 60.98% for all the years of research), they would like to be more included (50.7% on average) and assessed that having the possibility to exert influence is very important (an average of 45%). However, a non-negligible part of the citizens believed that making a better society is not their job (39.02%), did not want to be more included in the decision-making processes (an average of 22.16%) and did not find it necessary to have the chance to exert influence (an average of 11.18% find it little important, while 11.74% find it completely unimportant).

Civic participation in Macedonia: Initiatives for the common good

In 2012, slightly more than a fifth of the citizens said that they had participated in a civic initiative, while in 2013 the percentage of active citizens suggests that every fourth citizen participated in a civic initiative for the common good. The civic engagement underwent a significant increase from 2013 to 2014 when 32.9% – a third of the respondents confirmed that they had been part of some kind of a civic initiative, yet no significant changes followed after 2014.

The most numerous civic initiatives in the period from 2012 to 2016 were the environmental actions related to cleaning and waste collecting, afforestation or organized repairs to infrastructure (roads, water-supply, sewerage, etc.) while getting engaged in humanitarian actions was relevant to 19% to 25.1% of the citizens who had been part of some kind of a civic action.

Civic engagement in Macedonia: Activism

Apart from the contacts with the local authorities, the Macedonian citizens make very rare individual attempts to settle an issue at hand by contacting the institutions. In the period from 2012 to 2016, in order to settle a social problem, on average every fifth citizen contacted the municipality; the MPs were contacted by less than a tenth fraction of the citizens, while the government representatives, i.e. ministers, were contacted by less than 5% of the citizens. It is interesting to observe that in order to deal with a social issue at hand, consistently during all of the years of research, there is higher probability that the citizens would turn to the political parties, than to their elected representatives. When it comes to the activities, in the period 2012 to 2014 participation in public hearings on local problems is ranked highest, with participation of an average of 16.3% of the citizens, although in 2015 and 2016, the percentage of citizens who confirmed that they had taken part in protest rallies, public demonstrations and public gatherings increased, and according to the data from the respondents 20.9% of them had been part of activities like these in 2015, and 17.7% in 2016. This finding corresponds to the social turmoil from the past two years when mass protests took place in Macedonia.

The participation in hostile activism (protests and signing petitions) underwent a significant increase in 2015, when the engagement in contact activism established by communicating with public institutions (local authorities, MPs and government representatives) or political parties, and the engagement in constructive activism related to engagement in groups and public hearings, or giving proposals and submitting applications to the public institutions significantly declined.

Conventional civic engagement in Macedonia: Voting at elections

The voter turnout, according to citizens' statements in the period from 2012 to 2016, has not significantly changed, and on average eight out of ten citizens (79.82%) aged 18 to 66 declaratively voted at (nearly) all the elections, while seven out of ten (69.62%) citizens have stated that they will certainly vote at the next elections. Only a small part of the citizens (on average 3.38% for all the five years) stated that they never used their right to vote, or are certain that they would not vote (an average of 5.4% for all five years).

Civic engagement in Macedonia: Volunteering

The percentage of citizens who were members of some organization, group or club did not significantly change in the period between 2012 and 2016 and it can be said that on average less than a fifth of the citizens had donated their time to so-called traditional volunteering. On average, in the period between 2012 and 2016, four out of ten citizens (39.36%) got engaged less than once a week, but at least once a month offering free aid in the organization/club that they were members of, while additional three out of ten citizens (or 27.78% on average) volunteered at least once a week. Informal volunteering is much more frequent among citizens, and on average for the five years, high 87.98% of the citizens helped a friend or a stranger. Most of the citizens, on average of 68.02% have donated (for example blood, clothes, money...), and the lowest number of them provided personal care to a sick and weak person (24.76% on average for all five years), or represented someone (an average of 24.2% for all five years). Although informal volunteering is more common among citizens, most of

them rarely practice it (50.17% in the period from 2012 to 2014) or practice it only when necessary (an average of 62.45% from 2015 to 2016).

Predicting civic activism and engagement in civic initiatives

The will for engagement which assumes personal responsibility for social change and inclination for increased involvement in the decision-making processes, as well as membership in organizations, clubs and groups as a prerequisite for formal volunteering increased the likelihood of participation in civil initiatives for the common good and engagement in each of the three forms of civil activism. The probability for participation in civil initiatives for the common good and engagement in contact and constructive activism significantly increases with the increase in the confidence in one's own power to influence, while when it comes to hostile activism, the key role is the evaluation of the changes that took place and engagement with confrontational activism, especially by participating in rallies and demonstrations, underwent an increase in 2015 simultaneously with a significant decline in the probability to assess changes for the better in Macedonia.

INTRODUCTION

ENGAGEMENT IN PUBLIC POLICIES AND SCIENTIFIC LITERATURE: INDICATORS OF CIVIC ENGAGEMENT

Civic engagement as a concept is a crucial component for a healthy democratic society. **Engaged citizenship, i.e. citizens who are actively involved in improving their communities and their country** are a huge benefit to the civil society and the main indicator of healthy communities, a democratic state and satisfied citizens (Ehrlich, 2000; Zaff, Boyd, Li, Lerner, & Lerner, 2010).

Civic engagement, in the broadest sense of the word, is a set of attitudes, knowledge and skills, yet above all activities which are useful to society, i.e. they improve the common good and the community's wellbeing (Lenzi et al., 2012; Youniss, McLellan, Su, & Yates, 1999). These activities, which are mainly voluntary, can be found under various terms that are usually used interchangeably. The most frequently used terms are: civic participation, civic engagement, civic activism, civic involvement, active citizenship and civil engagement (Lenzi, et al., 2012).

Volunteering, on the other hand, is defined as an integral part of civic engagement and thus further highlights the societal benefits from civic engagement. Hence, the International Labour Organization assesses that the volunteering contributes to the global economy with at least 400 billion (American) dollars, and, in addition to this, contributes in the process of training the workforce (ILO, 2008).

An important terminological, as well as conceptual distinction was introduced by Dejaeghere & Hooghe (2009), who differentiate between conventional participation and civic engagement, whereby conventional participation is related to the use of the existing state mechanisms for influence and, in fact, constitutes political activity, such as, for example, voting, or election turnout, while the concept of "engagement" is related to volunteering, helping and activities within the community. Volunteer work is further divided in formal and informal, whereby formal volunteering is volunteering through NGOs, non-profits and other types of organizations (we also call it traditional volunteering), while informal or non-traditional is the direct help given to individuals, outside the frames of a certain organization.

CIVIC ENGAGEMENT MODELS

In order to answer the questions of who participates and why, two meta-theoretical perspectives can be singled out (Charles Pattie, Seyd, & Whiteley, 2004); according to the first one, civic engagement is an individual choice based on assessments of the usefulness of one's own involvement, while according to the second one, the level of participation is the outcome of the social structure determining the resources, and thus the opportunities for participation. The first standpoint relies on the assumptions of the rational actor and is represented in the general incentives model (Whiteley & Seyd, 1998; Whitely & Seyd, 1996), while the second standpoint may be described through the models of civic voluntarism (Verba et al., 1995; Brady et al., 1995) and social capital (Putnam, 1993, 2001), which describe the activity of the individual through his/her belonging to social groups.

According to Downs' Economic Theory of Democracy (1957), citizens, in their political activity, are economically rational actors who are trying to maximize their profit and minimize their cost. Starting from this rationality premise, in the general incentives model (Whiteley & Seyd, 1998; Whitely & Seyd, 1996) civic engagement occurs if the involvement costs are low, and the profit of engagement high. Citing Olson (1971), the authors distinguish between collective and selective profits from the

engagement. The collective profit refers, above all, to the public policies adopted or changed as a result of the civic efforts, the benefits of which are also felt by those who were not engaged in activism, while selective benefits are private goods which are limited only to the participants, and can be process-related – such as catharsis or satisfaction from the engagement, or can result in guaranteed outcomes for those involved – for example, political ambition may be the driving force behind civic engagement. As it has already been emphasized, the engagement takes place if the costs are lower than the profits, but it is crucial to stress that it is the benefits that serve as motivation for action depending on the actor's confidence in its effectiveness: the less he/she is convinced that his/her personal actions will affect the outcomes, the less he/she will devote him/herself to the engagement. This means that apart from the profit-loss ratio, the perception of political efficiency also plays a key role on the "calculus" of civic engagement.

Although the general incentive model (Whiteley & Seyd, 1998; Whitely & Seyd, 1996) relies on the rational choice framework, it also elaborates on the "irrational" variables from social psychology, such as the expressive motives and social norms of engagement. Engagement is not only a function of costs and benefits, but also of the affective attachment: those who feel strong belonging to the social community are more likely to act on behalf of it than those who do not feel affiliation. Engagement on this basis does not only stem from the promise of benefits from the involvement, but also from the feeling of loyalty and identification with the community that one acts for. Finally, collective engagement outside the theorization of cognitive calculations also depends on the social norms such as consensual evaluations and prescriptions for civic engagement. There is higher probability for involvement if the exceptionally "significant" others participate.

If in the models of rational choice we stress the engagement incentives, in socio-economic models we stress the other side of the equation, i.e. the resources necessary to act. Civic engagement is less certain among younger, less educated and poorer (Pattie & Johnston, 1998; Charles Pattie, Seyd, & Whiteley, 2003). Civic engagement and political participation are not only a personal choice because they are stratified according to their socio-economic status (Uslaner & Brown, 2005). Although significant intersectionality has been recorded between the socio-economic factors and civic engagement, the inherent paradox of this model is the absence of cross-temporal connection. For example, by analyzing the voters' behaviour from the second half of the XX century in the USA, Lyons & Alexander (2000) establish a decline in the voter turnout, although the aggregate levels of formal education undergo an increase.

As an attempt to further elaborate the socio-economic framework for civic engagement, we can point to the civic voluntarism model (Verba et al., 1995; Brady et al., 1995; Parry et al., 1992), which apart from emphasizing the importance of resources objectified through the socio-economic status and the available time, also stresses the attitudes which mediate the impact of the socio-economic status, such as the feeling of political efficiency and the interest and information on engagement. Civic engagement is demonstrated by those who can – have the time, money, education and "civic skills" which allow for competent participation, as well as those who believe they can have influence and those who are interested in getting involved. The more the citizens are convinced that their standpoints and actions will affect the outcomes of decision-making, the more likely it is that they will engage in political action. Although similarly to the model of general incentives (Whiteley & Seyd, 1998; Whitely & Seyd, 1996), the perception of political efficiency is also relevant to the model of

civic voluntarism, there is still a subtle difference in the conceptualization. In the general incentives model, the perception of the possibility to influence necessarily relies on the objective probability of a successful action (Whitely & Seyd, 1996), while in the civic voluntarism model, the assessments of one's own effectiveness are above all subjective evaluations related to the feeling of efficiency of individuals or groups. Therefore, they are largely determined by the resources which facilitate or restrict influencability, and in line with this those who have a higher socio-economic status (income, education, job prestige) should have a stronger feeling of political efficiency. Since it was initially developed as an explanation for political participation, this model also emphasizes the importance of party identification and general involvement in the political system, as well as the catalyst function of the mobilization networks. Membership in civic organizations and volunteering engagement facilitate participation by creating recruiting networks and enabling the practicing of so-called "civic competences". The latter refer to the communication and organization competences which according to the authors of the model are crucial for effective engagement, and are gained through formal education, professional engagement and involvement in various organizations.

The third relevant theoretical framework is the social capital model (Putnam, 1993, 2001) which explains civil participation through community integration. According to the model, membership in local organizations and involvement in formal and informal associations and groups enables the creation of collaboration networks which rely on the rules of reciprocity (Putnam, 2001). Inherent reciprocity encourages trust in others, making it possible for such associations to become social capital which can be "invested" in collective engagement for joint goals and change in public policies. Although the operationalization of the concept is problematic, according to certain authors (Dekker & Van den Broeck, 1998; Putnam, 1993), in contrast to the isolated and fragmented societies, societies who are richer in social capital have more responsible and more responsive institutions. When measured as interpersonal trust, social capital in Whiteley's cross-national research (2000) significantly predicts the variations in economic growth, which suggests that social capital may also be converted into financial capital. However, despite the enthusiasm for revitalizing civil society by mobilizing citizens to volunteer and become members in civil associations and clubs, some authors (Theiss-Morse & Hibbing, 2005) emphasize that in kind of apolitical engagements in pragmatic activities, such as humanitarian actions, often becomes an alternative and replacement for activism the aim of which is to raise the burning political issues and "stir" the political coalitions installed within the institutions.

Although in the presented models, the attitudes towards the possibilities for action such as the belief in political efficiency and the attitudes towards the communities such as the sense of belonging are conceptualized as predictors of civic engagement, the possibility of reverse impact should not be ruled out. Citizens who are actively engaged in improving their own communities have a stronger sense of belonging to their communities and thus improve the well-being of society and their own well-being, because through their civic engagement they feel useful and connected to their communities (Lerner, 2004; Zaff & Michelsen, 2001). Some authors go as far as to claim that active involvement in improving the communities does not only improve society and citizens' satisfaction, but also the citizens development itself, as civic engagement is closely correlated to the attitudes expressing confidence in the functionality of the system, confidence in their own communities and fellow-citizens, as well as confidence in their efficiency and usefulness (ILO, 2008; Zaff, et al., 2010).

CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND YOUTH

The correlation between civic engagement and social inclusion is particularly important when it comes to marginalized groups, such as, for example, ethnic minorities and youth in particular, who are often described as a lethargic, disengaged and socially excluded group (Blais, Gidengil, & Nevitte, 2004; Franklin, 2004; Jois & Toppe, 2005; Kimberlee, 2002; Korunovska Srbijanko, Korunovska Avramovska, & Maleska, 2011, 2012a; Pippa, 1999).

The concern about **decreased civic engagement of youth** is the topic of a large number of studies and public policies and, for decades already, this is considered to be a **crisis** situation, because the increased youth **disengagement**, especially in elections¹ (EC, 2013; UNDP, 2012a, 2012b), jeopardizes the survival of the democratic society, i.e. the survival of representative democracy. In this new globalized world of digital media, young people are assessed as a group that fails to grasp the importance of public policies and traditional civic activism, i.e. they are a group that fails to see any use in them (Bennett, Wells, & Rank, 2007). Hence, youth are assessed not integrated in “adult society” i.e. as socially excluded (Dejaeghere & Hooghe, 2009; Harris, Wyn, & Younes, 2010).

Not all authors are concerned about the decline of youth civic engagement. Many of them believe that although youth do not participate in their communities in the traditional sense of the word (for example by voting in elections or joining political parties), they “compensate” with new, progressive ideas and behaviors, especially through the new media, as well as street performances, volunteering and protest rallies (Bennett, et al., 2007; Dejaeghere & Hooghe, 2009; Jois & Toppe, 2005). These authors claim that the instable social context that youth have found themselves in has contributed to them redefining their political style of action by opting to engage in new activities, such as local level volunteering, consumer activism, support for global causes, participation in international activities and creating a global civil society by participating in the social media and forums, instead of the conventional types of civic engagement (Bennett, et al., 2007; Cohen, 2005; Dejaeghere & Hooghe, 2009; O’Toole & McDonagh, 2003; Zaff, et al., 2010).

However, emphasizing the decrease in the (conventional) youth civic engagement and understanding the reasons that lead to this phenomenon is important, because research shows that civic participation has been stable through the years, and consequently that those who are (in)active when young will probably remain (in)active when they become adults (Jois & Toppe, 2005), but also because the number of young people who are characterized as lethargic and uninterested increases with every passing year, and as we already mentioned, jeopardizes the survival of representative democracy.

CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN THE COUNTRIES OF MIDDLE AND EAST EUROPE: COMMUNISM AND TRANSITION TO PLURAL DEMOCRACIES

The fact that most of the findings, theories and research refer to highly developed countries which have a long history of plural democracy is also worrying, i.e. it is a fact that the situation with civic society in less developed countries is virtually unexplored. As a result of this scarcity of information, it is interesting to focus on the differences between the younger and older generations from the systems which were subjected to transition from the socialist (communist) society into parlia-

¹ As we already mentioned, voting at elections is also a subcategory of civic engagement, because the citizens who vote at elections are actively (albeit indirectly) involved in the political decisions about their own community. Voting at elections was also labeled conventional civic engagement.

mentary democracy. The potential differences between the younger and older generations in their attitudes about political and civic governance, as well as the differences in the level and manner of active engagement for the purpose of improving the communities can easily be anticipated, as in these countries the older and younger generations have grown up in completely different systems of governance and values. What is typical of these countries are the relatively new political, economic and civic systems, while the civic society there is still developing and has not yet achieved maturity or stability. The context is so different and the systems are undergoing such continual change that we can even expect differences in the strength and the existence of the so-far discussed established connections between civic engagement and all its indicators, such as, for example, social inclusion, the connection to the communities, the citizens' attitudes and expectations, as well as their demographic characteristics.

While in the communist regimes in Southeast Europe, participation in the "communist youth" was automatic and involuntary (without the youth being offered any real autonomy and participation in the policy making), the youth today insufficiently take advantage of this new system which offers increased possibility for their involvement (Kovacheva, 2000). Kovacheva, (2000) claims that the youth from post-communist countries are repulsed by formal affiliation, so less than 10% (in some countries even less than 5%) of the youth are members of civil society organizations. Thus, they miss the opportunity to actively engage in the decision and policy making. According to the author, this is due to the inherited mistrust in the institutions of the system when it comes to them involving the youth in decision-making. Therefore, the youth from these countries prefer to engage in spontaneous, informal movements and protests, and their election turnout declines, although, in general, the average election turnout of the youth in Middle and East Europe is higher than the one in the developed countries (Kovacheva, 2000).

The concern about the situation with civic society in post-communist countries does not only revolve around the youth. Although scarce, the existing literature on civic engagement in post-communist countries suggest lower civic involvement and awareness in these countries in comparison to the countries in Western Europe and North America (Lenzi, et al., 2012; Mondak & Gearing, 1998). This discrepancy can be partially explained with the low economic development and the high unemployment rate in most of these countries. Thus, in their 20-year-long analysis of civic engagement in USA, Lim & Sander (2013) expose a strong connection between employment and civic engagement, whereby the employed are constantly more engaged than the unemployed. Furthermore, they reveal a significant positive correlation between political participation and the periods of major global unemployment (increased participation in political parties of both employed and unemployed in times of global unemployment), as well as a decline in civic engagement in periods of increased economic inequality, i.e. income inequality among various groups of people. This is also relevant to our context, because in post-communist countries, due to the change in the system, the inequality among citizens and the unemployment soared. Kovacheva (2000) also makes a correlation between the high unemployment rate among youth with their social exclusion and stresses that the employed have better opportunities (information) to get involved, and are generally more motivated because they feel useful, i.e. they are not depressed and skeptical towards the social order due to their specific position in society.

CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN MACEDONIA

When it comes to the status of civic participation in the Republic of Macedonia, research shows that the situation is invidious. According to the international comparative report by *Gallup*, which measures civic engagement through only three indicators,² Macedonia is placed at a low 106 position among 130 countries, while our neighbors take up 4 of the last 7 places of countries with lowest index of civic engagement (Gallup, 2011). According to this survey, 26% of Macedonian citizens donated money, while only 7% volunteered their time and one third, or 33% helped a stranger, which is significantly below the world average which amounts to 30% for donations, 20% for volunteering and 46% for help to strangers, and below USA, which are at the top of the list, where 65% of the citizens donated money, 43% volunteered and 73% helped a stranger (Gallup, 2011). According to the latest report (Gallup, 2016), the situation has additionally worsened, and in 2015 Macedonia dropped on the 119 place among 140 countries (Gallup, 2016) thus placing itself among the ten lowest-ranked countries according to the percent of people who have volunteered their time in organizations (7%). This invidious situation is also reflected in the findings presented in the Strategy for Development and Promotion of Volunteering of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy (MLSP, 2010). The research cited in the Strategy emphasizes the low civic engagement: 10% of citizens volunteered in 2006 according to the study by CIRa,³ half of whom are civic organizations; 16% in 2007 and 27% in 2009, according to MCMS⁴ (Klekovski, Krzhalovski, & Jakovleska, 2007; Klekovski et al., 2009; MLSP, 2010; CIRa, 2006).

The strategy concludes:

“Based on the previous experiences and indicators, it is evident that volunteering in the Republic of Macedonia is not on an enviable level. There is a general lack of awareness in the public about the advantages of volunteering. Moreover, there is lack of access to rapid information about the possibilities to volunteer among certain groups of people, especially among the elderly. This leads to a lack of appreciation for volunteering in public, and its recognition as relevant experience, e.g. when looking for a job”.

The conclusions from the studies published after the Strategy are similar: “civic engagement is low” (Klekovski, Stojanova, Jakovleska & Nuredinoska, 2011), and there have been no changes in the volunteering activities (Klekovski, Jakovleska & Stojanova, 2011). Volunteering is not only low, it is also irregular, i.e. usually it is a one-time event. The Strategy of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy states that the citizens of RM, on average, volunteer 10 hours of their time per year, while the survey of the use of time by the State Statistical Office assess that the unemployed and economically inactive Macedonians on average spend 3 minutes a day volunteering, while their employed fellow-citizens spend 4 minutes a day. This makes a total of 24 hours per year for the employed, and 18 hours per year for the unemployed, which makes up for two or three days of volunteering per year (SSO, 2009)

² Donating money to charity, volunteering one’s own time in an organization and giving help to strangers.

³ Center for Institutional Development

⁴ Macedonian Center for International Cooperation

The reasons for low civic participation can be found in the unsettled subsistence of the citizens (MLSP, 2010; CIRa, 2006), which is in accordance with the scientific literature which, as we already stressed, suggests a correlation between unemployment and low civic participation. If it is taken into account that the unemployment rate in Macedonia is constantly around (and often above) 30% over the course of the two and a half decades of plural democracy, this situation is not surprising (SSO, 2013b).

The grounds for concern are even greater for young Macedonians. First of all, because even the basic statistics of youth election turnout are unavailable (Korunovska Srbijanko, et al., 2012a). Secondly, the unemployment rate among youth is regularly around (and often above) 50%⁵ (SSO, 2013b) which is an indicator of huge social exclusion of youth (Korunovska Srbijanko, Korunovska Avramovska, & Maleska, 2013). It is logical that those young people who are unable to find a job within their communities (towns and villages) will look for a way out of them, and consequently it would be superfluous to talk about a sense of belonging to a community or civic engagement within, when the communities are unable to provide the youth with basic subsistence and when the youth are leaving the country on a large scale. Thus, the migration report of the World Bank assesses that the Macedonians who have migrated are 22% of the total population of Macedonia (World Bank, 2011a, 2011b), while the International Labour Organization claims that young people aged between 18 and 35 make up the largest part of the migrants (ILO, 2011).

Apart from the youth who have already left the country, it is also worrying that high 34% of those who have stayed in the country, would like to permanently leave it if they had the chance (Gallup, 2014). *Gallup's* report does not provide detailed data into how many of these 34% of Macedonia who want to leave the country are young; however, worldwide, the majority of people who would like to migrate are aged exactly between 15 and 24 (Espirova, Ray, & Pugliese, 2011).

We have already shown that eight out of ten unemployed young people in Macedonia, in contrast to every second of the employed young people, would move from their own place of residence for a better job (Korunovska Srbijanko, Korunovska Avramovska, & Maleska, 2012b). Half of them (40% of the unemployed and 24% of the employed) would do this not only out of their places of residence, but also outside their countries⁶ (Korunovska Srbijanko, et al., 2012b). Even high-school students, who have not ventured out on the labour market yet, largely see themselves out of the country. In 2010, when asked "Where do you see yourself in 10 years" 46% of the high-school students said that they see themselves outside out of the country (Korunovska Srbijanko, et al., 2011, 2012b). One in ten young people, i.e. one in 5 young people in the oldest age group (between 26 and 29 years of age) have already moved places of residence within the country⁷ (Korunovska Srbijanko, et al., 2012b).

Apart from the tendencies for migration, the research conducted among Macedonian high-school students revealed that in 2009, only 16% of the high-school students worked (in a pair or a group) to solve a problem in the city where they lived, while 24% of them volunteered. Moreover, worrisome 68% believe that they cannot help, i.e. can only help a little in solving the problems their town is facing, and according to nearly half of the high-school students (48%) voting at elections is not import-

⁵ These statistics apply to youth aged between 15 and 24, but even among the group of youth aged between 24 and 29 the rate of unemployment is around 40%. Available at: <http://www.stat.gov.mk/Publikacii/2.4.14.04.pdf>

⁶ Data from the research done on a representative sample of 1209 young people aged 16 to 29.

⁷ Logically, the research conducted on the samples living within the country are not able to reach those young people who have already left the country.

ant at all, or is not very important (although 75% of their parents voted at all, or most of the elections) (Korunovska Srbijanko, et al., 2012b).

In summary, the situation with the civic engagement in Macedonia is poor, with indications of low civic and particularly low youth participation. Therefore, the goal of this study is to better understand and describe the situation, to unveil the reasons leading up to us, as well as the possible ways to encourage civic engagement.

The following two parts describe the methodology that we relied on in order to get the findings on civic engagement in Macedonia, as well as the situation with civic engagement in Macedonia. More specifically, in the part "Methodology" there is an explanation of the research procedure and the details on the sample of citizens who answered the questions from this study, while the questions that were posed, with an explanation for each of them, as well as the results, i.e. the answers to these questions by Macedonian citizens, are in the part "Results".

METHODOLOGY

OPERATIONALIZATION (MEASURABILITY) OF CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND VOLUNTEERING

For the purposes of our study we measured citizens' attitudes and their activity in the community. Relying on the reviewed literature, citizens were asked about their attitudes towards their community (sense of belonging and satisfaction), the attitudes towards their neighbors (trust in their neighbors and the neighbors' civic engagement), the attitudes towards their own ability to influence the decisions made within the communities and in Macedonia in general, as well as the attitudes about the importance, i.e., the significance of the possibility to influence (be involved in the decisions).

Apart from the attitudes, the citizens also answered whether they had participated in civic initiatives focused on solving problems or improving the communities, whether they had been active as citizens, i.e. politically active (conventional civic engagement, as well as participation at protests) and whether they had volunteered (formally, via organizations, or informally, by helping individuals). The specific questions and the details related to all the covered areas are described in the part "Results" of this study (the results are divided in areas).

PROCEDURE AND SAMPLE

The research started in 2012 and was conducted on an annual level, on a representative national sample aged 16 to 66. This study reports on the five years of research and is based on the samples from 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016.

The five samples were random samples collected in two stages (in two stages, by computer-assisted telephone interviews (CATI)). The first stage consists of plain, random-choice selection, while in the second stage we introduced stratification by four parameters (sex, age, ethnicity and region), in order to achieve approximate representativeness of the sample with the general population of the Republic of Macedonia. The sample is prepared by using the data on the population aged over 15 from the State Statistical Office (population census from 2002 and the most recent available population assessment from 31.12.2011 for the first sample, from 31.12.2012 for the second and third sample and from 31.12.2014 for the fourth and fifth sample) (SSO, 2012, 2013a, 2014). The research was conducted from 23 September to 20 November 2012 for the first sample, from 28 October to 19 November 2013 for the second sample, from 26 May to 20 June 2014 for the third sample, from 22 July to 8 October 2015 for the fourth sample and from 29 February to 8 April 2016 for the fifth sample. Statistically, the samples until 2014 do not differ in any single parameter, aside from the monthly income – it seems that the financial standing of the population aged 16 to 66 underwent a change so that in 2013 the citizens had significantly⁸ lower monthly income compared to 2012, while in the samples from 2015 and 2016 there were significantly⁹ more employees and significantly¹⁰ more students compared to the samples from 2012–2014.

⁸ $t(1032) = 2771,16, p = 0,000$

⁹ $\chi^2(4) = 35,44, p = 0,000$

¹⁰ $\chi^2(8) = 49,901, p = 0,000$

Demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the sample from 2012

The sample from 2012 consisted of 1209 respondents, 640 of whom were men (54%) and 546 (46%) women aged 16 to 66. The male respondents had slightly higher representation in comparison to the general population (50.14% men), however, this is within the margin of statistical error. The average age was 43, with the following division by age categories: 20.8% of the respondents were aged 16–26, 21.5% were aged 27–36, 20.3% were aged 37–46, 19.4% were aged 47–56 and 18.1% were aged 57–66.

The survey involved all the regions in the country: most of the respondents were from the Skopje Region (28.4%), followed by the Polog Region with 15.8%, the Pelagonija Region with 11.3%, 9.9% of the Southwest, 9% of the East, 8.2% of the Southeast, 9.9% from the Northeast, and the Vardar Region is represented with the lowest percentage of 7.6%. These strata are approximately representative for the general population aged 16 to 66. Most of the respondents (33.6%) lived in bigger cities, followed by those living in rural areas (28.9%). About a tenth, or 10.8% of the respondents were from smaller towns, 5.4% were from suburban areas, while every fifth respondent lived in the capital city of Skopje (21.4%).

The educational structure of the respondents was as follows: 12 respondents had not completed primary school, nearly one in five respondents (18.4%) had only completed primary education, more than half of the respondents had completed secondary education with 43.8% having completed vocational education and 12.8% high-school education. The last quarter of the respondents had a university degree in the least, 2.6% of whom have completed postgraduate, doctoral and specialist studies.

Ethnic structure. The majority of respondents declared themselves as ethnic Macedonians (73.4%), 17.1% declared themselves ethnic Albanians and 6.0% said they belonged to the other ethnicities. 42 respondents or 3.5% chose not to state their ethnicity.

Status on the labor market and economic power. Although the sample mainly consisted of subjects of prime working age, only 49.6%¹¹ of them reported they had paid work, regardless of whether they were officially registered as workforce or not. The remaining 49% said they did not work,¹² and 34 respondents (2.8%) refused to answer this question. The highest percentage of those who worked, (75.6%) worked for someone else, i.e. they were employed, while one quarter, or 24.4% were self-employed.

The average income¹³ of respondents was low, with 21.6% receiving less than 5,000 MKD, 47.0% getting less than 10,000 MKD and high percentage of 67.8% who had a monthly income of less than 15,000 MKD. Only 4.7% got more than 30,000 MKD, but 14.6% refused to answer the income-related question. Predictably, those who were employed had significantly higher incomes than the unemployed and inactive, however, even among them, nearly one-fifth (23.1%) received less than 10,000 MKD, and nearly half (49.6%) less than 15,000 MKD per month. Among the inactive and unemployed, 41.1% received less than 5,000 MKD, and 73.7% less than 10,000 MKD per month.

¹¹ Valid percents, without those who refused to answer.

¹² The questionnaire from 2012 did not distinguish between unemployed and economically inactive, only between people who work, and those who don't (regardless of whether they were unemployed or inactive).

¹³ It refers to income regardless of whether it comes from a salary, parents, spouses, social assistance or property. It is an amount of money that the respondents get on average from any source, on a monthly level.

Demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the sample from 2013

The sample from 2013 consisted of 1,120 respondents, 559 of whom were men (49.9%) and 561 (50.1%) women aged 16 to 66. The average was 41, with the following division into age categories: 20.4% of the respondents were aged 16 to 26, 21.6% were aged 27-36, 19.9% were aged 37-46, 10.1% were aged 47-56 and 18.0% were aged 57-66.

The survey included all the regions in the country: the majority of the respondents were from the Skopje Region (30.3%), followed by 15.1% from Pelagonija, 11.6% from the Polog Region, 10.9% from the Southwest, 8, 4% from the Northeast, 8.2% from the East, 8.0% from the Southeast and the lowest number, i.e. 7.4% was from the Vardar Region. These quotas were representative of the general population aged 16 to 66 years. The majority of respondents (44.5%) lived in the cities across the country, followed by those living in rural areas (33.6%) while more than every fifth respondent lived in the capital city of Skopje (21.9%).

The educational structure of the respondents was as follows: 18 respondents had not completed primary education, nearly one in five respondents (17.7%) had only completed primary education, more than half of the respondents had completed secondary education (55.5%). The remaining fifth (23.3%) of the respondents had completed higher education (including college education) and 2.2% have post-graduate, doctoral and specialist studies.

Ethnic structure. The majority of respondents declared themselves as ethnic Macedonians (74.4%), 17.8% as ethnic Albanians and 7.9% had a different ethnic background.

Status on the labour market and economic power. Although the sample mainly consisted of subjects of prime working age, only 47.1% of them reported they had a paid job, regardless of whether they were officially registered as workforce or not. The remaining 52.2% said they did not work, while 4 of them refused to answer this question. The highest percentage of those who worked, (71.2%) worked for someone else, i.e. they were employed, while one quarter, or 28.8% (including farmers) were self-employed (including farmers). The remaining 56.8% are economically inactive (30.0% for the entire sample). The most frequent cause for inactivity is old age, i.e. retirement (30.3% of the inactive) and a similar number of citizens also give education (29.4%) and housework (28.3%), including pregnancy and taking care of children, as the main reason for their economic inactivity. A small proportion of the respondents (5.7%) did not work as a result of invalidity or diseases, 2.1% were redundant or insolvent workers and another 2.1% declared themselves discouraged by the labour market (e.g. "there's no work", "no one would hire me", etc). The average income¹⁴ of the respondents was low, i.e. 39.9% received less than 5,000 MKD a month, while high 75.3% received less than 15,000 MKD. Only 3.8% of the respondents received more than 30,000 MKD, 4.8% refused to answer the question about income. The employees, expectedly, had higher income than the unemployed and inactive. Only 6.5% of the employed received less than 5,000 MKD, however, more than half 54.4% received less than 15,000 MKD. The majority of the inactive and unemployed (68.3%) received less than 5,000 MKD, and 92.7% less than 15,000 MKD a month.

¹⁴ It refers to personal income regardless of whether it comes from a salary, parents, spouses, social assistance or property. It is an amount of money that the respondents get on average from any source, on a monthly level, after taxation.

Demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the sample from 2014

The sample from 2014 consisted of 1,187 respondents, 599 of whom were men (50.5%) and 588 (49.5%) women aged 16 to 66. The average age was 40 and a half, with the following division by age groups: 21.7% of the respondents were aged 16–26, 20.7% were aged 27–36, 19.9% were aged 37–46, 20.1% were aged 47–56 and 17.7% were aged 57–66.

The survey included all the regions of the country: the majority of respondents were from the Skopje Region (29.7%), followed by 15.3% from the Pelagonija Region, 11.5% from the Polog Region, 10.7% from the Southwest, 8.6% from the East, 8.5% from the South, 8.2% from the Northeast, while the lowest number, i.e. 7.4% were from the Vardar Region. These quotas were representative of the general population aged 16 to 66. The majority of respondents (43.0%) lived in cities across the country, followed by those living in rural areas (30.5%), while more than every fifth respondent lived in the capital city of Skopje (26.5%).

The educational structure of the respondents was as follows: 15 respondents (1.3%) had not completed primary school, while 16.7% had only completed primary education. More than half of the respondents had completed secondary education (55%). The remaining quarter (25%) of the respondents had completed higher education (including college education), while 2% had completed postgraduate, doctoral and specialist studies.

Ethnic structure. The majority of respondents declared themselves as ethnic Macedonians (78.3%), 14.4% as ethnic Albanians and 7.2% as belonging to other ethnicities.

Status on the labor market and economic power. Although the sample consisted of respondents in prime working age, only 47.2% of them stated they had a paid job, regardless of whether they were officially registered as workforce or not. The remaining 52.6% said they did not work, while 3 respondents refused to answer this question. The largest part of those who work, (75.3%) worked for someone else, i.e. an employer, while a quarter, or 24.7% were self-employed (including farmers). Out of those who did not work, 46.2% were looking for a job, meaning that they are unemployed (the unemployment rate is 24.3% for the entire sample), while the remaining 53.6% were economically inactive (28.1% of the entire sample). The most common reason for inactivity was retirement (33.4% of those who were inactive). It is followed by education (26.2%) and housework (17.5%), including pregnancy and childcare as the main reason for economic inactivity. A small number of the respondents (4.2%) did not work due to disability or illness, 3.3% were redundant or insolvent workers and as much as 4.2% declared themselves unmotivated to join labor market (e.g., “there’s no work” “no one will hire me” etc.). The average income¹⁵ of the respondents was low, namely 34.3% received less than 5,000 MKD per month, and high 73% received less than 15,000 MKD per month. Only 2.4% earn more than 30,000 MKD, while 10.2% refused to answer the question about their income. The employees, as expected, had higher income than the unemployed and inactive, i.e. only 7.9% of them received less than 5,000 MKD, yet more than half (52.7%) received less than 15,000 MKD per month. The majority of the inactive and unemployed (59.9%) received less than 5,000 MKD, while 92.4% of them received less than 15,000 per month.

¹⁵ It refers to personal income regardless of whether it comes from a salary, parents, spouses, social assistance or property. It is an amount of money that the respondents get on average from any source, on a monthly level, after taxation.

Demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the sample from 2015

The sample from 2015 consisted of 1,215 respondents, 613 of whom (50.5%) were women and 602 (49.5%) were men aged 16 to 66. The median age was 41 years, and divided in age groups, 21.7% of respondents were aged 16–26 years, 22% were aged 27–36 years, 19.6% were aged 37–46 years, 19.9% aged 47–56 years, 16.8% were aged 57–66 years.

The survey included all of the regions of the country: the majority of respondents were from the Skopje Region 32.7%, followed by 13.3% from the Polog Region, 12% from Pelagonija, 10.2% from the South-west, 8.4% from the Southeast, 8.3% from the Northeast, 7.7% from the Vardar Region, while the lowest number of respondents – 7.3% were from the Eastern region. These quotas are roughly representative of the general population aged 16 to 66. Most of the participants, 44.6%, lived in cities, followed by those living in rural areas 30.3%, while every fifth respondent lives in the capital of Skopje 25.1%.

The educational structure of the respondents was as follows: 16 respondents (1.3%) had not completed primary education and 13.2% had only completed primary education. More than half of the respondents had completed secondary education – 53.7%. The remaining 31.8% of the respondents had completed higher education, 4% of whom had also proceeded to complete postgraduate, doctoral and specialist studies.

Ethnic structure. The majority of respondents declared themselves as ethnic Macedonians – 75.2%, 15.6% said they were ethnic Albanians and 9.1% were from other ethnicities. Only 4 respondents did not state their ethnicity.

Status of the labor market and economic power. Although the sample was of prime working age, only 52.9% of the respondents reported having a paid job, regardless of whether they were officially registered as workforce or not. The remaining 46.8% said they did not work, while 3 respondents refused to answer this question. Most of those who work – 75.7% – work for someone else, i.e. were employees, while a quarter, or 24.3% are self-employed. In 2015, 40.5% received less than 10,000 MKD and high 58.1% received less than 15,000 MKD per month.

Demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the sample from 2016

The sample from 2016 consisted of 1,236 respondents, 613 men (49.6%) and 623 (50.4%) women aged 16 to 66. The average age was 42 years, with the following division by age groups: 19.6% of the respondents were aged 16–26, 20.1% were aged 27–36, 19.6% were aged 37–46, 21.4% were aged 47–56 years and 19.3% were aged 57–66.

The survey included all regions of the country. The majority of respondents were from the Skopje Region (30.5%), followed by 11.2% from Pelagonija, 15.1% from the Polog Region, 10.5% from the South-west, 8.3% from the East, 8.3% of the Southeast, 8.1% of the Northeast, while the lowest number, i.e. 8.0% were from the Vardar Region. These quotas are representative for the general population aged 16 to 66.

The majority of respondents (41.3%) live in cities throughout the country, followed by those living in rural areas (32.7%), while a quarter, or four in ten live in the capital city of Skopje (26%).

The educational structure of the respondents is as follows: 15 respondents (0.6%) had not completed primary education, while 14.6% had only completed primary education. More than half of the re-









spondents had completed secondary education (52.3%). The remaining part (28.6%) of the respondents had completed higher education (including college education), while 4.0% had completed postgraduate, doctoral and specialist studies.

Ethnic structure. The majority of the respondents declared themselves as ethnic Macedonians (77.5%), 15.1% as ethnic Albanians and 7.4% as other ethnicities.

Status of the labor market and economic power. Although the sample consisted of subjects of prime working age, only 56.3% of them reported having a paid job, regardless of whether they were officially registered as workforce or not. The remaining 43.6% said they did not work, while 2 respondents refused to answer this question. Most of those who work, (72.8%), work for someone else, i.e. are employees, while a quarter, or 27.2%, are self-employed (including farmers). Out of those who did not work, 38.8% were looking for work, i.e. they were unemployed (16.9% of the entire sample), a remaining 61.2% are economically inactive (26.7% in the whole sample). The most common reason for inactivity was retirement (43% of those who are inactive). It was followed by education (29%) and housework (11.2%), including pregnancy and childcare as the main reasons for economic inactivity. A small number of the respondents (4.7%) did not work due to disability or illness, 3.4% were redundant or insolvent workers, while 2.5% declared that they had been discouraged by the labor market (e.g., “there’s no work” “nobody will hire me” etc.).

The average income¹⁶ of the respondents was low – in fact, 22.6% received less than 5,000 MKD per month and soaring 65.8% received less than 15,000 MKD per month. Only 4.6% received more than 30,000 MKD, while 15.2% refused to answer the question of income. Those who were employed, as expected, had higher incomes than the unemployed and inactive, i.e. only 7.1% of them received less than 5,000 MKD, yet nearly half (49.5%) received less than 15,000 MKD per month. The majority of inactive and unemployed (42.2%) received less than 5,000 MKD, and 86.6% less than 15,000 MKD per month.

¹⁶ It refers to personal income regardless of whether it comes from a salary, parents, spouses, social assistance or property. It is an amount of money that the respondents get on average from any source, on a monthly level, after taxation.



RESULTS

CITIZENS AND THEIR COMMUNITIES: ATTITUDES TOWARDS THEIR NEIGHBORS, SENSE OF BELONGING, SATISFACTION WITH THE PLACE OF RESIDENCE

TRUST IN THE NEIGHBORS | CYNICISM

The existing scientific literature on the topic of civic engagement suggests that the sense of belonging to a community, regardless of whether it is on a local or a national level, plays a large role in the citizens' decision to take active part in improving the communities that they live in. Therefore, this part of the analysis has the goal to examine the sense of belonging of the respondents on several different grounds, including whether they are satisfied with the immediate environment they live in, to what extent they feel as a part of their communities, and whether they trust their neighbors and fellow citizens.

The first series of questions that we report refers to the respondents' perceptions about the people that they share their communities with, or more specifically, whether there is solidarity and trust among the citizens on a local level. For this purpose we posed two questions.

With the first question, the respondents assessed whether, i.e. to what extent their neighbors act in solidarity with them, and how often they help each other, by using a four-grade scale ranging from "never help" to "help all the time".

With the second question, we asked the respondents to think about the trust they have in their neighbors and answer whether their neighbors are to be trusted, or, they expect that they would take advantage of them (abuse them for their personal benefit) if they had the chance for it.

As an answer to the question, the respondents were to select one of two extreme statements:

- "most of your neighbors can be trusted" or
- "if they had the chance, most of them would take advantage of you"


As it can be noticed from the data submitted in table 1, and displayed in graph 1, **most of the citizens (aged 16 to 66) or nearly half of them, assessed that neighbors rarely help each other.** However, an average of 44.4% of the citizens in the period from 2012 to 2016, are convinced that their fellow-citizens are trustworthy, i.e. that they help each other often of all the time. **The average assessment of the solidarity of neighbors is highest in 2012, then significantly drops in 2013, while in the period between 2013 and 2016, it does not significantly change.**

TABLE 1. SOLIDARITY AMONG NEIGHBORS

Do you believe that the people from your neighborhood act in solidarity, i.e. help each other?

	2012		2013		2014		2015		2016	
	f	Valid %								
They help each other all the time	179	15,3	111	10,0	142	12,1	138	12,0	146	12,8
They often help each other	410	35,0	326	29,4	389	33,2	345	30,1	367	32,2
They rarely help each other	473	40,4	554	50,0	540	46,0	565	49,3	533	46,8
They never help each other	108	9,2	118	10,6	102	8,7	99	8,6	94	8,2
Total valid	1170	100,0	1109	100,0	1173	100,0	1147	100,0	1140	100,0
I have just moved here / Unanswered	39		11		14		68		96	
Total	1209		1120		1187		1215		1236	

Based on the findings of the socio-demographic analysis, the most prominent differences are between the two ethnic groups. **In the period from 2012 to 2015, compared to ethnic Macedonians, ethnic Albanians assess their neighbors as more helpful, and although there is no significant difference in the variation during the years of research,** it is still evident that it is lowest in 2016, and highest in 2015, when 63.44% of the Albanians said that their neighbors help each other often or all the time, compared to 37.34% of the Macedonians. Although they are less pronounced than the ethnic differences, differences between age groups also occur consistently through the years, i.e. **the youth give higher grades on the solidarity among neighbors** and the difference (although it also does not significantly change through the years) is highest in 2016, when 54.21% of the youth said that their neighbors help each other often or all the time, in contrast to 41.76% of the older respondents.

GRAPH 1. SOLIDARITY/HELPFULNESS AMONG NEIGHBORS

As it can be noticed from the data in table 2, more prominent division in the attitudes on the benevolence of fellow-citizens can be observed in the answers to the question about whether their neighbors can be trusted. **In the period from 2012 to 2016, about half of the citizens believe that their neighbors would take advantage of them, and nearly an equal percentage are convinced that their neighbors can be trusted.**


TABLE 2. TRUST AMONG NEIGHBORS

When thinking about your neighborhood, your neighbors and the trust you have in them, would you say that...

	2012		2013		2014		2015		2016	
	f	Valid %								
Most of your neighbors can be trusted	570	51,7	489	46,3	534	46,4	494	47,3	527	48,9
Most of them would take advantage of you if they had the chance	532	48,3	568	53,7	618	53,6	550	52,7	551	51,1
Total valid	1102	100,0	1057	100,0	1152	100,0	1044	100,0	1078	100,0
50/50	33						146		139	
I have just moved here / Unanswered	74		63		35		25		19	74
Total	1209		1120		1187		1215		1236	

Although the percentage of respondents who trust their neighbors is higher only in 2012, there is stability through the years, and the proportion of those who trust their fellow-citizens does not significantly change in the period from 2012 to 2016.

GRAPH 2. TRUST AMONG NEIGHBORS



When it comes to the trust among neighbors, the differences by lines of ethnic background are the most consistent through the years, and the pattern of correlation is also consistent with the findings on the ethnic differences in the assessment of solidarity among neighbors. **In 2012, 73.85% of ethnic Albanians said that they trusted their neighbors, in contrast to 46.76% of Macedonians. However, it would be preferable to emphasize that the trust among neighbors has a downward trend among Albanians too, and it can be noticed that only 60% said that they trusted their neighbors in 2013, as opposed to 73.85% in 2012.** In 2013 and 2016, minor, yet important discrepancies were observed according to the level of education, and it can be noticed that people with higher education are more likely to trust their neighbors compared to those with secondary education. To illustrate this, in 2016, 57.59% of those with higher education said that they trusted their neighbors, in contrast to 45.14% from those with secondary education. In 2015, significant differences also occur by region, and the answers lead to an observation that the inhabitants of the Polog and Skopje Region are more likely to trust their neighbors compared to the inhabitants of the East and Southeast Region. Finally, in 2016 differences were also traced by gender groups – trust among neighbors is more frequent among men, 54.20% of whom trust their neighbors (as opposed to 43.65% of women).

Construction of the aggregate indicator “benevolence of neighbors”

The extracted component “benevolence of neighbors” explains for 70.26% of the variance in the answers to the questions about the solidarity of the neighbors and the possibility of trust in them. The internal consistency according to Cronbach’s $\alpha = .53$, although lower than the conventional value for satisfactory reliability, is still solid as it is calculated on only two items. The correlation between two variables amounts to $r = .42$ and according to its value it is close to moderate.

The aggregate indicator for “benevolence of neighbors” was constructed in the following way: two negative answers (my neighbors would take advantage of me and the neighbors rarely or never help each other) were coded with -1; one positive and one negative answer were graded with a 0 for the respondents; while to positive answers (neighbors can be trusted and they often or constantly help each other) had a grade of 1.



SENSE OF BELONGING TO A COMMUNITY

The sense of belonging to a community is considered to be one of the main precursors of civic engagement and activism, because only citizens who feel that are a part of their community (from both the immediate and wider community) will strive to improve them. The sense of belonging is also considered to be tightly correlated to the trust among neighbors, as good neighborly relations and cohabitation in communities are an integral part of the sense of belonging and satisfaction with the community.

The sense of belonging to a community was measured by means of three direct question: to what extent respondents feel they are a part of, i.e. to what extent they belong to the immediate neighborhood (residential area) they live in, to what extent they feel they are a part of their own village or town as a wider community and, finally, to what extent they feel they are a part of, i.e. they belong in Macedonia. Since in 2012 there was no major discrepancy between the sense of belonging to the immediate neighborhood (residential area) and the sense of belonging to the city or village of the respondents, in 2013 the question about the sense of belonging to the immediate environment was not posed again, but it was reintroduced in 2014, 2015 and 2016. The data about the answers to the three questions is displayed in tables 3, 4, 5, and in graphs 3, 4, 5.

TABLE 3. SENSE OF BELONGING TO THE NEIGHBORHOOD

To what extent do you FEEL AS A PART of your neighborhood, residential area, i.e. to WHAT EXTENT DO YOU BELONG to your neighborhood? Consequently, would you say that...


	2012		2014		2015		2016	
	f	Valid %						
You have a strong sense of belonging	766	64,3	655	55,8	707	58,8	701	57,3
You have a partial sense of belonging	318	26,7	373	31,8	357	29,7	383	31,3
You have a low sense of belonging	72	6,0	97	8,3	94	7,8	89	7,3
You have no sense of belonging	36	3,0	49	4,2	44	3,7	50	4,1
Total valid	1192	100,0	1174	100,0	1202	100,0	1223	100,0
Unanswered	17		13		13		13	
Total	1209		1187		1215		1236	

In the period between 2012 and 2016 most of the citizens, or an average of 59.05%, reported that they felt a strong sense of belonging to the neighborhood they lived in. The average figures related to the sense of belonging to the neighborhood were highest in 2012, and significantly dropped in 2014, without any significant changes in the period from 2014 to 2016.

The sociodemographic background of the citizens was not related to prominent differences in the sense of belonging to the neighborhood/residential area, although an interesting trend of an increase in the level of identification with the immediate community can be spotted among those **with higher education. In 2013 and 2014, this category of citizens had the lowest sense of belonging to their neighborhoods/residential areas, but, in 2015 the sense of belonging among them increases, so that in 2016, according to the average grades, the people with higher education**

have a higher sense of belonging to their neighborhoods/residential areas in comparison with the citizens with lower education. If in 2014 48.91% of those with higher education said that they had a strong sense of belonging to their neighborhood/residential area, in 2016, 58.3% of them feel strongest sense of belonging to their neighborhood/residential area.

GRAPH 3. SENSE OF BELONGING TO A NEIGHBORHOOD



When it comes to the question which examines the identification with one's town or village, most, or more than half of the respondents in the period from 2012 to 2016 stated that they felt a strong sense of belonging to their town or village. The average figures related to the sense of belonging to the town or village do not change significantly in the period between 2012 and 2016, but similarly to the sense of belonging to the neighborhood/residential area, in 2014, the percentage of respondents who said that they feel a strong sense of belonging is comparably lowest from the period between 2012 and 2016.


TABLE 4. SENSE OF BELONGING TO A TOWN/VILLAGE

To what extent do you belong to your town/village?

	2012		2013		2014		2015		2016	
	f	Valid %								
You have a strong sense of belonging	761	63,9	674	61,1	645	54,8	679	56,3	663	54,1
You have a partial sense of belonging	318	26,7	275	24,9	362	30,8	383	31,8	404	33,0
You have a low sense of belonging	75	6,3	106	9,6	117	9,9	91	7,5	113	9,2
You have no sense of belonging	36	3,0	48	4,4	52	4,4	53	4,4	45	3,7
Total valid	1190	100,0	1103	100,0	1176	100,0	1206	100,0	1225	100,0
Unanswered	19		17		11		9		11	
Total	1209		1120		1187		1215		1236	

When it comes to the sense of belonging to one's own town/village, no established pattern which would distinguish a certain category of citizens which felt lower identification with their local community consistently in the period between 2012 and 2016 was found, but the drop in the sense of belonging from 2012 to 2013 of the inhabitants of Skopje and the inhabitants of the Vardar Region is worth mentioning. In 2012, 92.99% of the inhabitants of Skopje said that they felt a strong or partial belonging to their town, while in the next year, 2013, 83.26% chose one of these two levels of belonging. The decline in the sense of belonging to their town is even more dramatic among the inhabitants of the Vardar Region, where 93.38% expressed strong or partial sense of belonging to their local communities in 2012, while in 2013 this percentage plunged to 76.25%.

GRAPH 4. BELONGING TO A TOWN/VILLAGE



In the period from 2012 to 2016, most of the citizens, or an average of two out of three, felt a strong sense of belonging to Macedonia. However, in the period between 2012 and 2016, a linear downward trend may be observed in the average figures. The highest average grade occurred in 2012 and it significantly dropped in 2013, yet according to the findings from the multiple cross-examination, there were no significant changes between 2013 and 2016.

TABLE 5. SENSE OF BELONGING TO MACEDONIA


To what extent do you belong to Macedonia?

	2012		2013		2014		2015		2016	
	f	Valid %								
You have a strong sense of belonging	903	75,5	761	68,7	795	67,7	772	64,2	772	63,6
You have a partial sense of belonging	185	15,5	209	18,9	213	18,1	264	22,0	284	23,4
You have a low sense of belonging	63	5,3	68	6,1	99	8,4	96	8,0	84	6,9
You have no sense of belonging	45	3,8	69	6,2	68	5,8	70	5,8	73	6,0

Total valid	1196	100,0	1107	100,0	1175	100,0	1202	100,0	1213	100,0
Unanswered	13		13		12		13		23	
Total	1209		1120		1187		1215		1236	


When it comes to the sense of belonging to Macedonia, the differences based on ethnicity are highest. Consequently, in the course of all of the surveyed years, the ethnic Albanians felt a lower sense of belonging to Macedonia in comparison to ethnic Macedonians. The difference in the average figures did not undergo significant changes, but it can be noticed that it was highest in 2014, when 73.13% of the ethnic Macedonians said that they feel a strong sense of belonging to Macedonia, in contrast to 40.72% of the Albanians. However, a decline in the sense of belonging can be found in both of the ethnic communities, so that if in 2012 8 out of ten (80.82) ethnic Macedonians said that they felt a strong sense of belonging to Macedonia, in 2016 only two thirds of them (68.76%) expressed the highest sense of belonging. The decline is even more dramatic among ethnic Albanians, in 2012 half of them (55.45%) expressed highest sense of belonging, but in 2016, only 37.91% of them gave this answer. **In the period between 2014 and 2016, when it comes to the national identity, differences also occur among the age groups, and according to the findings, in 2016, only 43.23% of the citizens younger than 29 said that they feel a strong sense of belonging to Macedonia, in contrast to 70.44% of the older citizens.** In 2014 and 2016, significant discrepancies in the sense of belonging to their country were observed among the participants from various regions and consistently, the lowest sense of belonging according to the average grades was felt by the inhabitants of the Northeast Region, while the average grades were relatively higher among the inhabitants of the Southwest and Vardar Region, although it is worth mentioning that the average grade of the Southwest Region is more stable throughout the years of research.

GRAPH 5. SENSE OF BELONGING TO MACEDONIA



In conclusion, we can summarize that identifying oneself with one’s community, regardless of whether it is on a micro or macro level, was highest in 2012, and there was a visible downward trend in the percentage of respondents who felt a strong sense of belonging to their places of residents. Among most of the categories of the citizens, the national identity is stronger than the local, although the discrepancies in the percentages decline in 2015 and 2016. However, it must be stressed that the percentage of citizens who feel a strong sense of belonging to their country is lower among ethnic Albanians in comparison to the percentage of citizens who will a high sense of belonging to their neighborhood, consistently in the course of all the years of research (see graph 6).

GRAPH 6. ETHNIC DIFFERENCES IN THE SENSE OF BELONGING IN THE MICRO AND MACRO COMMUNITY 2012–2016



Construction of the indicator “sense of belonging to the community”

The extracted component “sense of belonging to the community” explains for 58.73% of the variance in the answers to the question about the sense of belonging to the neighborhood/residential area, town/village and Macedonia. The internal consistence according to Cronbach’s $\alpha = .64$ is lower than the conventional value for satisfactory reliability. The coefficients of correlation between the three variables vary within the range of $r = .26 - .47$ and the correlation between the sense of belonging to the town/village and the sense of belonging to a neighborhood/residential area is highest, while the correlation between the sense of belonging to the neighborhood/residential area and the sense of belonging to Macedonia is lowest.

The aggregate indicator for “sense of belonging to a community” is constructed as a median of the three measured variables of the sense of belonging (to the neighborhood/residential area, town/village and Macedonia).



SATISFACTION WITH THE PLACE OF RESIDENCE AND THE WORK OF THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES

SATISFACTION WITH THE PLACE OF RESIDENCE

The trust in one's neighbors and the sense of belonging to a community are concepts tightly related to the citizens' satisfaction with their places of residence. In 2012, full emphasis was placed on the satisfaction with the local community (immediate place of residence, neighborhood, town, village, municipality), but in 2013 and 2014, 2 more questions about the satisfaction with Macedonia were added. The questions about the satisfaction with the community were the following:

1. How satisfied, i.e. dissatisfied are you with your neighborhood as your place of residence (was not posed in 2013)?
2. How satisfied, i.e. dissatisfied are you with your town or village as a place of residence?
3. How satisfied, i.e. dissatisfied are you with Macedonia as a place of residence (was not posed on 2012)?

The data about the answers to the three questions is displayed in tables 6, 7 and 8, and in graphs 7, 8 and 9. The majority of citizens, or an average of four out of ten, stated that they were partially satisfied with their neighborhoods or residential areas, while more than a third said that they were very satisfied in the period from 2012 to 2016.


TABLE 6. SATISFACTION WITH THE IMMEDIATE LOCAL COMMUNITY, NEIGHBORHOOD, OR RESIDENTIAL AREA

In general, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your immediate neighborhood as a place of residence?

	2012		2014		2015		2016	
	F	Valid %						
Very satisfied	450	37,9	387	32,7	453	37,4	469	38,1
Partially satisfied	525	44,2	524	44,3	480	39,7	521	42,3
Somewhat satisfied	145	12,2	160	13,5	172	14,2	140	11,4
Not satisfied at all	68	5,7	112	9,5	105	8,7	102	8,3
Total valid	1188	100,0	1183	100,0	1210	100,0	1232	100,0
Unanswered	21		4		5		4	
Total	1209		1187		1215		1236	

The average grade for satisfaction with the immediate community significantly plunged from 2012 to 2014, and does not further change dramatically, although the variations in the averages grades may be described through a significant U-shaped trend, which means that the satisfaction drops from 2012 to 2014, but then increased again by 2016.

GRAPH 7. SATISFACTION WITH THE IMMEDIATE LOCAL COMMUNITY - NEIGHBORHOOD OR RESIDENTIAL AREA



When it comes to the satisfaction with the immediate local community, differences between the various demographic categories were only recorded in 2014 and 2015. In 2014, the satisfaction with their neighborhood/residential area among citizens with lower incomes declined (in comparison to 2012), and significant differences were recorded between the participants with incomes ranging between 5 and 10 thousand MKD, 68.91% of whom said that they are (partially or very) satisfied, and the respondents with incomes ranging from 10 to 20 thousand MKD, 84.15% of whom (an average of the two categories) said that they were partially or very satisfied. In 2015, men were more frequently satisfied with their neighborhoods/residential areas with 80.63% percent of them stating that they were satisfied (very or partially) with the neighborhood/residential area they lived in, in contrast to 73.65% of the women.


TABLE 7. SATISFACTION WITH THE LOCAL COMMUNITY - TOWN OR VILLAGE

How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your town/your village as a place of residence?

	2012		2013		2014		2015		2016	
	f	Valid %								
Very satisfied	465	38,9	346	31,0	415	35,0	395	32,6	379	30,7
Partially satisfied	498	41,7	487	43,6	493	41,6	514	42,5	563	45,6
Somewhat satisfied	153	12,8	173	15,5	179	15,1	176	14,5	182	14,7
Not satisfied at all	78	6,5	111	9,9	98	8,3	125	10,3	111	9,0
Total valid	1194	100,0	1117	100,0	1185	100,0	1210	100,0	1235	100,0
Unanswered	15		3		2		5		1	
Total	1209		1120		1187		1215		1236	

Similarly to the evaluations of the immediate neighborhood/residential area, in the period between 2012 and 2016, most of the citizens said that they were partially satisfied with their town or their village. The average assessment of the local community was highest in 2012 and then significantly dropped in 2013 when it WAS lowest, but did not significantly differ from the grades for the period from 2014 to 2016.

GRAPH 8. SATISFACTION WITH THE LOCAL COMMUNITY - TOWN OR VILLAGE




In the data from 2012 and 2013, we can trace differences in the satisfaction with their own towns or villages among the respondents from the various regions. In 2012, the residents of the Pelagonija Region were the most satisfied, while the residents of the Northeast Region were the least satisfied. In 2013, the citizens' satisfaction with the Pelagonija Region dropped and they were among the citizens most dissatisfied with their town or village, together with the villages of the Northeast and Skopje Region, while the residents of the Southwest Region were the most satisfied. In 2013, significant differences were recorded in the satisfaction with the place of residence between the citizens with highest and lowest income - as expected, the people income lower than 5,000 MKD were less satisfied with their towns and villages as opposed to those with higher incomes of up to 20,000 MKD. The denominator of the difference is consistent in all the years of research - the citizens with lowest income are those who are most dissatisfied, yet, the difference reached substantiality only in 2013 when 85.61% of the citizens with income higher than 20,000 MKD were partially or very satisfied with their towns, as opposed to 68.17% of the citizens with income lower than 5,000 MKD. Finally, in 2014, differences occur with the satisfaction with one's town/village based on the level of education and it can be concluded that the people with secondary education are those who are most satisfied with their towns - 79.38% of them said that they were partially or very satisfied, in contrast to 10.81% of those with lower education, but this difference was not steady through the years.

TABLE 8. SATISFACTION WITH MACEDONIA

What about Macedonia? How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with Macedonia as a place of residence?

	2013		2014		2015		2016	
	f	Valid %						
Very satisfied	305	27,6	351	29,8	345	28,9	338	27,5
Partially satisfied	475	43,0	475	40,4	474	39,7	464	37,8
Somewhat satisfied	196	17,7	200	17,0	182	15,3	211	17,2
Not satisfied at all	129	11,7	150	12,8	192	16,1	216	17,6
Total valid	1105	100,0	1176	100,0	1193	100,0	1229	100,0
Unanswered	15		11		22		7	
Total	1120		1187		1215		1236	

Although the citizens identify with their country the most, the percentage of citizens who are very satisfied with Macedonia is lower than the percentage of citizens who are very satisfied with their towns and villages and immediate neighborhoods and residential areas in the course of all of the years of research. Most of the citizens, or four out of ten were partially satisfied with Macedonia and the average grade did not significantly change through the years in the period between 2013 and 2016.

GRAPH 9. SATISFACTION WITH MACEDONIA

Consistently, through all the years of research, ethnic Macedonians were more satisfied with Macedonia than ethnic Albanians. The absolute difference was highest in 2016, when 7 out of ten Macedonians (70.45%) stated they were (very or partially) satisfied with their country, in contrast to only four out of ten (40.64%) of ethnic Albanians. It is also worth mentioning that the difference between the two ethnicities was lowest during the previous year (2015) when there was

an increase in the percentage of satisfied people among the ethnic Albanians (from 45.24% in 2014 to 58.70% in 2015). In 2015 and 2016 significant differences occurred in the satisfaction with their country among both the youth and in the elderly, and in both years the elderly were more satisfied than the youth, although in both groups, the satisfaction declined in 2016. **In 2015, 72.13% of the elderly were satisfied with their country, but in 2016, the percentage of those (very or partially) satisfied drops to 68.80%, while when it comes to the youth, the drop is from 59.64% in 2015, to 54.69% in 2016.**

Construction of the indicator “satisfaction with the place of residence”

The extracted component “satisfaction with the place of residence” explains for 61.29% of the variance in the answers to the questions about the satisfaction with the neighborhood/residential areas, the town/village and Macedonia. The internal consistency according to Cronbach’s $\alpha = .68$, although lower than the conventional value for satisfactory reliability is sold, as it is calculated on only three items. The coefficients of correlation between the three variables vary within the range of $r = .28 - .50$, and the correlation between the satisfaction with the town/village and the satisfaction with the neighborhood/residential area is highest, while the correlation between satisfaction with the neighborhood/residential area and the satisfaction with Macedonia is the lowest.

The aggregate indicator of “satisfaction with the community” is constructed as a median of the three measured variables of satisfaction (satisfaction with the neighborhood/residential area, the town/village and Macedonia).



SATISFACTION WITH THE WORK OF THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND ASSESSMENT OF THE CHANGES IN THE COMMUNITIES

Apart from generalized assessment of the immediate communities, we also wanted to find out from the citizens how satisfied they were with the work of the local communities, as well as how they valued the changes in their communities. The respondents were required to answer:

1. How satisfied, i.e. dissatisfied they were with the way in which the local authorities manage the municipality?
2. Did they believe that in the past year¹⁷, their town/village had become a better or worse place for living, or do they believe that it had not changed a lot?
3. Did they believe that during the previous year Macedonia had become a better or worse place for living, or, did they believe that it had not changed a lot (not posed in 2012)?
4. Where did they see themselves in 5 years, in their present place of residence, moving to a rural area of the country, moving to a different town/city in the country, moving to Skopje, or moving abroad (not posed in 2012)?

The data about the answers to the four questions is shown in tables 9, 10, 11 and in graphs 10, 11, 12. Although there is a significant positive correlation between the satisfaction with the place of residence and the satisfaction with the work of the local authorities, i.e. those who are more satisfied with their places of residence are more likely to be satisfied with the work of the municipal authorities, still, the citizens' satisfaction with the work of the local authorities is dramatically lower compared to the satisfaction with their places of residence, while in 2015, only 11.1% said that they are very satisfied. **On the other hand, the number of those who are dissatisfied reaches nearly half (46% in 2012 and in 2013, and 48% in 2014) of the citizens aged 16 to 66 in the period until 2014, and it proceeds to increase to slightly more than half of the respondents (54.5%) in 2015.**

TABLE 9. SATISFACTION WITH THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES


All in all, how satisfied i.e. dissatisfied are you with the way in which the local authorities manage your municipality?

	2012		2013		2014		2015		2016	
	f	Valid %								
Very satisfied	214	18,4	165	15,2	179	15,4	131	11,1	157	13,1
Partially satisfied	417	35,8	424	39,0	423	36,5	408	34,6	385	32,1
Somewhat satisfied	223	19,1	209	19,2	224	19,3	216	18,3	213	17,8
Not satisfied at all	312	26,8	288	26,5	333	28,7	425	36,0	444	37,0
Total valid	1166	100	1086	100	1159	100	1180	100	1199	100,0

¹⁷ In 2012, "in the previous two years".

As it can be anticipated from the previously presented data, when it comes to the average assessments, a linear downward trend can be observed through the years, although a multivariate analysis suggests that a significant decline occurred from 2014 to 2015.

GRAPH 10. SATISFACTION WITH THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES



Women gave more favorable evaluation of the work of the local authorities from 2012 to 2014, but in 2015, the differences disappeared, as the evaluations of the local self-government declined more dramatically. In comparison: If in 2015, 57.98% of the women said that they were (very or partially) satisfied with the local authorities, in 2015 the percentage of women who provided any of these two answers dropped to 45.96%. The downward trend was comparatively lower in men, and if in 2012 50.57% were (very or partially) satisfied with the local authorities, in 2015, 45.39% provided one of these two answers. In 2014, significant differences per region were also recorded and it can be concluded that the most dissatisfied were the residents of the Northeast Region where 32.98% said that they were partially or very satisfied with their local self-government. Finally, in 2016, the differences in the amount of the income also played a significant role, and, as expected, there was a positive correlation – 51.81% of those with income higher than 20,000 MKD said that they were partially or very satisfied with the local authorities, in contrast to 39.23% of those with income ranging from 5 to 10 thousand MKD.


As was already mentioned, apart from the direct question about the satisfaction with the place of residence, the citizens were also to assess to what extent their place of residence had changed during the previous 2 years (for the sample from 2012), i.e. during the previous year (for the samples from 2013 to 2016).

TABLE 10. CHANGE IN THE LOCAL COMMUNITY

In general, do you think that your town/your village has become a better or worse place to live in the past year [2012 - in the past 2 years], or, do you think that not much has changed?

	2012		2013		2014		2015		2016	
	f	Valid %								
The town/village is a better place to live	555	46,5	437	39,2	464	39,4	345	28,5	366	29,8
The town/village is a worse place to live	212	17,8	189	17,0	191	16,2	287	23,7	288	23,4
The town/village has not changed a lot	426	35,7	489	43,9	523	44,4	577	47,7	575	46,8
Total valid	1193	100,0	1115	100,0	1178	100,0	1209	100,0	1229	100,0
Unanswered	16		5		9		6		7	
Total	1209		1120		1187		1215		1236	

The percentage of respondent who believed their place of residence had changed for the better declined in the period from 2012 to 2016, and similarly like in the assessment of the work of the local authorities, a statistically significant decline was established in 2015 when a significantly lower percentage said that their towns changed for the better in comparison to 2014.

GRAPH 11. CHANGE IN THE LOCAL COMMUNITY

The socio-demographic analysis¹⁸ suggests that in 2012, there were two significant discrepancies between the older and younger respondents. Although most of the respondents from both age groups

¹⁸ The sociodemographic analysis of the variable that refers to the evaluation of the changes in the local community were performed with logistic regression, and in accordance to this only the two categories of answers suggesting extreme evaluation entered the analysis.

said that the town/village had changed for the better, the possibility for an answer which would suggest that the town or village had changed for the better was higher among the youth (79.44% of the young, in contrast to 69.62 of the older respondents). **However, similarly to the assessments of the work of the local authorities, it is recommended to emphasize the decline through the years and in comparison, in 2015 only 48.88% of the youth said that the town had changed for the better, as opposed to 56.82% of the older respondents.**

Most of the differences in the evaluation of the changes between the towns with different socioeconomic background occurred in 2015 and 2016. In both years, the respondents with higher education were least likely to register changes for the better. For example, in 2016, 48.43% of those with higher education said that the town/village had changed for the better, in contrast to 57.94% of those with secondary education, and 67.03% of the citizens with primary education. In addition, in 2015, the probability for optimism in the perception of the changes was higher among the female respondents, 59.86% of whom said that their town had changed for the better, in comparison to 49.70% of the men. From the comparison of the data for 2015 by regions, we can conclude that the residents of the Southwest Region were the most optimistic, whereby the probability to give an answer according to which the town or village they live in had changed for the better, was lowest in the East Region. In 2016 there were also differences based on income, and a significant linear trend can be observed, i.e. with an increase in the income up to 20.000 MKD, the probability of the answer that the town/village has changed for the better, also increases. **Although in the period after 2012, the probability to establish changes for the better drops among all the groups of citizens, it can be observed that among those with income higher than 20.000, the “erosion” in the assessment is particularly emphasized, so that even if 76.86% said that the town had changed for the better in 2012, in 2015 49.02% gave this answer.**


TABLE 11. CHANGE IN MACEDONIA

Do you believe that in the previous year Macedonian became a better or worse place to live, or, do you think that not much has changed?

	2013		2014		2015		2016	
	f	Valid %						
Macedonia is a better place to live	422	39,4	468	40,9	364	31,2	359	29,8
Macedonia is a worse place to live	216	20,2	238	20,8	357	30,6	419	34,8
Has not changed a lot	433	40,4	439	38,3	447	38,3	426	35,4
Total valid	1071	100,0	1145	100,0	1168	100,0	1204	100,0
Unanswered	49		42		47		32	
Total	1120		1187		1215		1236	

Similarly to the changes that took place in the town or village, the percent of respondents who said that Macedonia changed for the better decreased in the period from 2013 to 2016. Once again, a statistically significant drop was found in 2015, when there were significantly less answers saying that Macedonia changed for the better occurred in comparison with 2014.

GRAPH 12. CHANGE IN MACEDONIA



When it comes to the perceptions about the changes in Macedonia, in 2014, 2015 and 2016 we can observe differences¹⁹ according to the level of education, and consistently throughout the years, the probability to chose the answer that Macedonia has changed for the better is lowest among the people with university education. In 2015, only 35.59% of the people with higher education said that Macedonia had changed for the better during the previous year, in contrast to 62% of the citizens with primary and 56.62% of the citizens with secondary education. Moreover, the probability to choose this answer is also higher among ethnic Macedonians in comparison to ethnic Albanians, and it is worth mentioning that the difference is lowest (and statistically insignificant) in 2015 (39.62% of the Albanians in contrast to 52.97% of Macedonians) and highest in the next year, 2016, when half of the Macedonians (52.13%) said that the previous year Macedonia changed for the better, compared to only a fifth of the Albanians (19.20%). In 2015 (similarly to ratio related to the changes of the town/village), the probability for an optimistic answer was higher among the older respondents, 54.54% of whom said that Macedonia had changed for the better, in contrast to 39.38% of the youth. In 2015 significant differences were also evidenced between the residents of the smaller towns and the residents of villages, and finally, in 2015 there were also significant differences on the basis of the monthly income – consistently with the findings about the differences in the assessment of the changes on a local level, the probability to assess changes for the better in Macedonia increased with the increase in the income up to 20.000 MKD. **The optimism that Macedonia has changed for the better the previous year is more likely to be found among women in all the years of research, yet this difference between the genders groups becomes statistically different only in 2016, when 53.56% of the women said that Macedonia changed for the better the previous year, in contrast to 39.10% of the men.**

In conclusion we can say that the percent of citizens who believe that their places of residence are improving declines and a statistically significant drop was recorded in 2015, when significantly less citizens marked a change for the better in comparison to 2014.

¹⁹ A logistic regression was conducted for the sociodemographic analysis of the variable on changes in Macedonia, so only the two extremes of the answers were used in the analysis.

Construction of the indicator “evaluating the changes in one’s place of residence”

The extracted component “evaluating the changes in one’s place of residence” explain for 86.75% of the variance in the answers to the questions for the town/village and Macedonia. The internal consistency according to Cronbach’s $\alpha = .85$ satisfies the conventional value for satisfactory reliability. The coefficient of correlation between the variables $r = .74$, i.e., a large effect size.

The aggregate indicator of “perception of change” was constructed as follows: two negative answers (finding of a change for the worse in both the town/village and in Macedonia) were coded with -1 ; one positive and one negative answer summed up to score of 0 for the respondent; while two positive answers (finding of a change for the better in both the city/village and Macedonia) brought a score of one.



TENDENCY FOR MIGRATION OUTSIDE THE PLACE OF RESIDENCE


In 2013, we introduced another indicator in the study measuring the satisfaction with the community the citizens live in, related to the intent to migrate away from one's place of residence. The respondents were asked where they saw themselves in five years, i.e. whether they thought that they would stay in their places of residence or would move away. In that way, we indirectly got an overview of those citizens who wanted to change their place of residence and believed they would be able to do so. The results are displayed in table 12 and in graph 13.

TABLE 12. TENDENCY FOR MIGRATION OUTSIDE THE PLACE OF RESIDENCE
Where do you see yourself in 5 years?

	2013		2014		2015		2016	
	f	Valid %						
In the place where I live	766	70,7	764	67,7	723	61,9	776	65,4
Away, in a rural area in the country (village)	31	2,9	29	2,6	36	3,1	31	2,6
Away, in another town in this country (other than Skopje)	32	3,0	39	3,5	35	3,0	31	2,6
Living in Skopje	25	2,3	36	3,2	45	3,9	36	3,0
Living abroad	229	21,1	260	23,0	329	28,2	312	26,3
Total valid	1083	100,0	1128	100,0	1168	100,0	1186	100,0
Unanswered	37		59		47		50	
Total	1120		1187		1215		1236	

Although during all of the years of research, two out of three citizens said that they plan to remain where they lived, the likelihood for the answer expressing intent for migration abroad linearly grew in the period between 2013 and 2016. **In 2013, every fifth respondent said that she/he was planning to move, but in 2015 and 2016 more than a quarter of the citizens were planning to leave Macedonia.**

GRAPH 13. TENDENCY TO MIGRATE AWAY FROM THE PLACE OF RESIDENCE



The sociodemographic analysis suggest that with regards to the intent to migrate, there are consistent differences throughout the years of research, between the citizens younger and older than 29. The probability to choose an answer expressing intent to move abroad in the next 5 years is higher among the youth, and when compared to 2014, the differences dramatically increase in 2015 and 2016, because the probability for this answer increases among the youth. **It is alarming that in 2016, as much as 51.9% of the youth said that they see themselves outside of their country in the next five years, in contrast to 18.06% of the older respondents.** In addition in 2015 and 2016 there were also significant differences according to the monthly income. **The probability to migrate abroad is highest among the people with income lower than 5.000 MKD and in the period between 2013 and 2016 we can spot a trend of an increase of those who would like to move away from their country among this group of citizens.** In 2016, 43.50% of the citizens with lowest income said that they saw themselves outside of Macedonia, in comparison to those with income from 15 to 20 thousand MKD.



ATTITUDES ABOUT CIVIC ACTIVITY WITHIN THE COMMUNITIES: CONFIDENCE IN THE POSSIBILITY TO INFLUENCE, THE IMPORTANCE OF THE POSSIBILITY TO INFLUENCE AND PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY

One of the most important factors that has affected the outcome of any human behavior are attitudes (Ajzen, 1988, 1991). Logically, this refers to all the categories of civic participation, including civic activism and volunteering. The citizens must first believe that their action will reap results, i.e. that it will be beneficial, in order to proceed with it. If the citizens are convinced that they are unable to influence the decision-making processes in their municipality, there is a great probability that they will not even dare to do it (even if they want to). Not only do the citizens have to believe that their action will lead to the desired results, but they also should be motivated to act. Civic activism and responsibility should be of significance to them.

For this purpose, we have examined the beliefs of the citizens of Macedonia with regards to their confidence in their own power to act, the personal responsibility for action, as well as the significance, i.e. importance of this possibility.

CONFIDENCE IN THE POSSIBILITY TO INFLUENCE

The trust in the possibility to influence was measured with two questions, one of which referred to the political efficiency on a local level, while the other covered the national level. The data on the answers of the two questions is displayed in tables 13, 14 and in graphs 14 and 15.

From the data in table 13, it can be concluded that **in the period from 2012 to 2015, more than half of the citizens aged 16 to 66 were convinced that they were not able to influence the decisions of the Municipality at all. On average, only 4.5% of Macedonians believed that they could influence the decisions made in their municipalities to a great extent, meaning that only 68,175 out of 1,465,670 citizens would feel safe that if they undertook some action or initiative within their municipalities, this initiative would not be discarded in some way, or rendered completely useless.**

TABLE 13. POSSIBLE INFLUENCE OVER THE MUNICIPAL DECISIONS


Can you, i.e. to what extent can you influence the decisions made for your municipality?

	2012		2013		2014		2015		2016	
	f	Valid %								
You can have great influence	52	4,5	47	4,3	54	4,7	55	4,7	54	4,5
You can have some influence	256	22,3	201	18,5	231	20,2	219	18,6	218	18,3
You can have little influence or	236	20,5	189	17,4	211	18,5	215	18,2	226	19,0
You have no influence	606	52,7	647	59,7	647	56,6	690	58,5	691	58,1

Total valid	1150	100,0	1084	100,0	1143	100,0	1179	100,0	1189	100,0
Unanswered	59		36		44		36		47	
Total	1209		1120		1187		1215		1236	

The average assessment of the ability to influence is highest in 2012, and then significantly drops in 2013, when it is lowest from the period 2012–2016.

GRAPH 14. POSSIBLE INFLUENCE OVER THE DECISIONS IN THE MUNICIPALITY



From the sociodemographic comparisons in 2012 and 2015, differences were recorded based on the ethnicity, and consistently, in both groups, the average assessment of their political efficiency on a local level is higher among ethnic Albanians although it is recommended to emphasize that nearly half of them (45.87% in 2012 and 48.43% in 2013), as well as most of the ethnic Macedonians (54.76% in 2012 and 58.44% in 2014) believe that they can have no influence over the local decisions at all. In 2013 and in 2015 the differences were lost because the average assessments of the Albanians declines, while the average assessments among the Macedonians were more stable. In 2013 we recorded differences between the age groups, and it is worth mentioning that the youth gave comparatively higher assessments to the possibility to influence the decisions of the municipality, although once against, most of the respondents from the two age groups believed that they have no influence (54.12% of the youth, in comparison to 61.71% of the older respondents). In 2015 and 2016, the differences between the age groups are not statistically significant, but the denominator of the differences is reverse (the youth are trivially more skeptical). In 2013, 2014 and 2016, significant differences were established based on the amount of income and the probability to highly assess their own effectiveness in the local decision-making processes was highest among the people with income higher than 20.000 MKD. In 2013, this group of citizens, according to the assessments of effectiveness, distinguished itself from the citizens with an income between 10 and 15 thousand MKD (which were the ones to assess their ability to influence), while in 2016, the citizens with highest income once again assessed their own power to influence as higher, in contrast to the citizens with income lower than 10.000 MKD. As was mentioned, significant income-based differences were also evident in 2014, when once again, the people with highest income were those who were most convinced

in their power to influence; however, it is interesting to comment on the increase in the percentage of the citizens who believe they can have influence from the group earning between 15 and 20 thousand MKD. In 2014, nearly a third of them (32.54%) believe that they can influence (partially or a lot) the local decisions, although in the previous and next year only about a fifth of them gave one of these two answers (21% in 2013 and 21.68% in 2015).

In 2015 additional differences occurred, and according to the place of residence and according to the findings, the rural residents have assessed their own power to influence the decisions in the municipality as higher in comparison to urban residents. Finally, in 2016 significant differences were also recorded per region, and the probability to assess their political effectiveness on a local level as high is lowest among the residents of the Northeast Region, who assessed their ability to influence their municipalities' decisions significantly lower than the residents of the Southeast and Polog Region.


The citizens' trust in their power to influence was most detrimental when it comes to decisions referring to their country. Most of them, or, on average, two out of three during all of the years of research (68.2%) were convinced that they cannot influence the decisions related to Macedonia at all.

TABLE 14. POSSIBLE INFLUENCE OVER THE DECISIONS ABOUT MACEDONIA
Can you, i.e. to what extent can you influence the decisions made for your municipality?

	2012		2013		2014		2015		2016	
	f	Valid %								
You can have great influence	34	3,0	41	3,8	40	3,5	52	4,5	37	3,1
You can have some influence	156	13,7	113	10,5	144	12,7	158	13,6	142	12,0
You can have little influence	157	13,8	175	16,2	157	13,8	181	15,6	185	15,7
You have no influence	794	69,6	748	69,5	793	69,9	772	66,4	816	69,2
Total valid	1141	100,0	1077	100,0	1134	100,0	1163	100,0	1180	100,0
Unanswered	68		43		53		52		56	
Total	1209		1120		1187		1215		1236	

In fact, on average, in the period from 2012 to 2016, 83.94% of the citizens aged between 16 and 66 believe that they can have little or no influence on the decisions made on a national level. On the other hand, on average, only 3.6% are convinced in their ability to intervene in the national decisions. The average assessment of the possibility to affect the national decisions did not significantly change and it can be concluded that in the period from 2012 to 2016, most of the citizens felt politically powerless.


GRAPH 15. POSSIBLE INFLUENCE ON THE DECISIONS ABOUT MACEDONIA



The uniform consent of the citizens about their own ineffectiveness when it comes to national decisions, is also supported by the findings which suggest that only education, out of all socio-demographic variables, occurs as a significant predictor, yet only in 2012 and 2013. In both these years, the citizens with lower education were more convinced in their political power than the citizens with higher education. For example, in 2012, 22.39% of the people with lower education said that they could have (great or some) influence over the national decisions, in contrast to 13.55% of those with higher and 16.20% of those with secondary education. The differences lose their statistical significance in the period between 2014 and 2016, because the average assessment of citizens with higher education slightly increases, but it remains unchanged among those with lower education.

GRAPH 16. ATTITUDES ON THE POSSIBILITY TO INFLUENCE THE DECISIONS : 2012 - 2016

% of citizens convinced that they are unable to influence



Заклучно, најголем дел од граѓаните не веруваат во својата делотворност во процесите на одлучување без оглед на тоа дали се случуваат на локално или национално ниво. Како што беше потенцирано, наодите се попозителни за политичката ефикасност што се рефлектира на национално ниво (види GRAPH 16).

Construction of the indicator “trust in one’s own power to influence”

The extracted component “trust in one’s own power to influence explains for 75.03% of the variance in the answers to the questions assessing the possibility to affect on a local and national level. The internal consistency according to Cronbach’s $\alpha = .65$, although lower than the conventional value for satisfactory reliability, is solid, as it has been calculated based on only two items. The coefficient of correlation between one’s own power to influence on a local and national level $r = 0.51$.

The aggregate indicator of “the trust in one’s own power to influence” was constructed as the mean value of the measured variables for trust in one’s own power to influence on a local and national level.



IMPROVING SOCIETY AS A PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY, THE IMPORTANCE OF THE POSSIBILITY TO INFLUENCE AND INCREASED INVOLVEMENT

Unfortunately, we saw that in the period between 2012 and 2016, most of the citizens believed that they were unable to take action within their own communities. However, do they want to be more involved, do they think that they should (do they have personal responsibility) be more involved, and how important it is to them to be able to be more involved in the decisions adopted in their communities?

In order for us to determine their beliefs regarding the importance of the possibility to influence, the will to get involved and the personal responsibility for change, the respondents were to answer the following questions:

1. How important is it to you, personally, to have the change to influence the decisions made within your local community/municipality?
2. Generally speaking, would you prefer to be more involved in the decisions adopted by the municipal council affecting your town, your village (in 2013 and 2014: your place of residence)?
3. Do you think that improving society is your personal responsibility or do you think that improving society is someone else's job?

The data from the answers to the three questions is displayed in tables 15, 16 and 17, and in graphs 17, 18 and 19. **From Table 15 it is evident that from the proposed four statements describing the subjective importance of the ability to influence, nearly half of the population aged 16 to 66 years, in the period between 2012 and 2016, selected the strongest statement, answering that it is very important for them to be able to influence the decisions of the municipality.** In light of these findings the previous finding of practical marginalization of citizens in the decision making processes is even more startling.


TABLE 15. IMPORTANCE OF THE POSSIBILITY TO INFLUENCE THE DECISIONS OF THE LOCAL COMMUNITY

How important is it to you, personally, to have the possibility to influence the decisions made in your local community/municipality?

	2012		2013		2014		2015		2016	
	f	Valid %								
Very important	510	44,2	465	42,4	528	45,7	580	49,1	552	46,0
Somewhat important	362	31,4	356	32,5	374	32,4	353	29,9	384	32,0
Not very important	152	13,2	127	11,6	123	10,6	119	10,1	125	10,4
Not important at all	129	11,2	149	13,6	130	11,3	129	10,9	140	11,7
Total valid	1153	100,0	1097	100,0	1155	100,0	1181	100,0	1201	100,0
Unanswered	56		23		32		34		35	
Total	1209		1120		1187		1215		1236	

The average assessment of the subjective importance of the possibility to influence the decision-making processes was highest in 2015, but did not undergo any significant changes in the period from 2012 to 2016.

GRAPH 17. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE POSSIBILITY TO INFLUENCE THE DECISIONS AFFECTING THE LOCAL COMMUNITY



The socioeconomic comparisons lead to the conclusion that during all of the years of research, education occurs as a factor determining the perceived importance of the possibility to influence. As expected, the people with higher education give a higher value to the ability to influence, in contrast to those with secondary and primary education. In 2015, 56.54% of the highly educated respondents said that that it was very important for them to influence the decision-making, as opposed to 45.73% of those with secondary education. In addition, in 2015 and 2016 significant differences appear between the younger and the older respondents, and the absolute difference was greatest in 2015, when 52.93% of the people older than 29 years said that it was very important for them to influence, in contrast to 39.21 of their younger compatriots.


Apart from the fact that most of citizens attach a high value to the possibility to influence, the majority of them or, on average, around half of them (50.7%), in the period between 2012 and 2016, want to be more involved in the decisions made by the municipality as well. On the other hand, around a fifth of the citizens explicitly stressed that they do not want any more involvement in the decision-making processes on a local level.

TABLE 16. WILL FOR INVOLVEMENT IN THE DECISIONS MADE IN THE MUNICIPALITY
 Generally speaking, would you like to be more involved in the decisions made by the municipal council which affect your town/your village?

	2012		2013		2014		2015		2016	
	f	Valid %								
Yes	626	53,3	545	49,2	595	50,6	631	52,5	589	47,9
No	269	22,9	258	23,3	244	20,8	264	21,9	269	21,9
It depends on the issue being decided upon	280	23,8	304	27,5	336	28,6	308	25,6	371	30,2
Total valid	1193	100,0	1115	100,0	1178	100,0	1209	100,0	1229	100,0
Unanswered	16		5		9		6		7	
Total	1209		1120		1187		1215		1236	

The probability to express will for greater involvement does not change statistically significantly in the period between 2012 and 2016, and the sociodemographic analyzes²⁰ indicate that consistently, during all the years of research, those who are more educated are more likely to express a preference for greater involvement. In the last year of 2016, 79.72% of the people with higher education said they wanted greater involvement compared to 65.32% of those with average and 55.47% of those with primary education.

GRAPH 18. WILL FOR INVOLVEMENT IN THE DECISIONS MADE IN THE MUNICIPALITY




²⁰ A logistic regression was conducted for the sociodemographic analysis of the variable on willingness to get involved in decision-making in the municipality, so only the extreme responses were used in the analysis (yes/no).

TABLE 17. RESPONSIBILITY FOR IMPROVING SOCIETY

Do you think that improving society is your personal responsibility, or is it someone else's job?

Improving society is:	2012		2013		2014		2015		2016	
	f	Valid %								
Personal responsibility	653	56,9	624	59,0	716	63,7	599	61	646	63,4
Someone else's job	494	43,1	433	41,0	408	36,3	383	39	373	36,6
Total valid	1147	100	1057	100	1124	100	982	100	1019	100
I don't know/ Equally both (work of all of us)	62		63		63		233		217	
Total	1209		1120		1187		1215		1236	

The respondents are divided in their answers to the question about the responsibility for improvement of society, **although in all the years of research, a higher percentage of citizens take personal responsibility (at least declaratively) for social change.**

GRAPH 19. RESPONSIBILITY FOR IMPROVING SOCIETY

Consistently with the previously presented findings of the socio-demographic analysis²¹ it appears that similarly to the will for involvement, the probability of taking responsibility (at least declaratively) also increases with the level of education, consistently across during all the years of research. In the last year - 2016, 77.98% of the people with university education said that the improvement of society is a personal responsibility, compared to 60.52% of persons with secondary education and 40-41% of those with primary education. Consistent pattern throughout the years was also traced when it comes to the ethnic differences and, according to the data, taking personal responsibility is more likely to occur among ethnic Macedonians. The absolute differences are largest in 2016 when 67.17% of Macedonians, in contrast to 44.74% of Albanians said that changes were a personal responsibility.

²¹ A logistic regression was conducted for the sociodemographic analysis of the variable on improving society, so only the two extreme answers were used in the analysis (personal responsibility/someone else's job).

Construction of the indicator “will for involvement”

The component “will for involvement” explains for 64.37% of the variance in the questions about the will for involvement and responsibility for change. The internal consistency according to Cronbach’s $\alpha = .65$ is less than the conventional value for satisfactory reliability, but is solid, taking into consideration that it is calculated on only two items. The coefficients of correlation between one own’s power to influence on a local and national level amount to $r = 0.45$.

The aggregate indicator “will for involvement” was constructed in the following way: two negative answers (“improving society is someone else’s job” and “I would not want greater involvement”) were coded with -1; one positive and one negative answer got the score of 0 for the respondents; while two positive answers (“improving society is a personal responsibility” and “I would like greater involvement”) was given a score of 1.



THE SITUATION WITH CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN MACEDONIA: INITIATIVES, ACTIVISM AND CONVENTIONAL CITIZENSHIP

We saw what the citizens' attitudes were towards their neighbors, communities, the possibility and importance to take action. On average, Macedonian citizens do feel a sense of belonging to their communities and are more satisfied than dissatisfied with them, however, they are divided when it comes to the trust they have in their neighbors. The average citizen is nearly convinced that he/she is in no way able to affect the decisions made within her/his community, although she/he believes that improving society is her/his personal responsibility and would like to be much more involved in her/his community. Yet, to what extent do Macedonian citizens actually engage in improving their own society and in dealing with the problems in their own communities? Is the conviction that nothing can change a crucial indicator of civic engagement, is personal responsibility the decisive factor, or is it the strong sense of belonging?

INFLUENCE OF THE COMMUNITY: CIVIC ACTIVISM IN THE LIGHT OF CIVIC ENGAGEMENT OF NEIGHBORS AND FELLOW-CITIZENS

We tried to determine the distribution of civic engagement in Macedonia through the citizens' reports on their engagement, but also the perceptions of collective engagement within their communities. In fact, before we asked the citizens whether they themselves had ever taken part in a civic initiative, they first assessed how often their neighbors and fellow-citizens got organized in order to improve their communities, i.e. how often they participated in civic initiatives for the common good. This question too was taken into consideration from three aspects: neighbors getting organized in immediate communities, i.e. neighborhoods, neighbors getting organized in broader communities, i.e. towns and villages, and initiatives organized on the level of the Republic of Macedonia. The data about the answers of the three questions is shown in tables 18,19 and 20 and on graphs 20, 21 and 22.


TABLE 18. NEIGHBORS' ORGANIZATION WITHIN THEIR NEIGHBORHOODS/ RESIDENTIAL AREAS

How often do the people from your neighborhood/residential area act together, i.e. get organized in order to improve the town/village?

	2012		2014		2015		2016	
	f	Valid %						
Constantly	125	10,7	118	10,1	114	9,6	123	10,1
Often	220	18,8	210	18,0	184	15,4	191	15,7
Rarely	575	49,2	521	44,7	529	44,4	567	46,7
Never	248	21,2	317	27,2	365	30,6	334	27,5
Total valid	1168	100,0	1166	100,0	1192	100,0	1215	100,0
Unanswered	41		21		23		21	
Total	1209		1187		1215		1236	

During all the years of research, most of the respondents, or nearly half of them, said that their neighbors rarely get organized. The average assessment of the neighbors' organization within the neighborhood/residential area was highest in 2012 and although the multiple comparisons indicate that there no significant changes occurred, a significant linear downward trends may be traced.

GRAPH 20. NEIGHBORS' ORGANIZATION WITHIN THEIR NEIGHBORHOODS/ RESIDENTIAL AREAS



When it comes to the perceptions about the neighbors' level of organization, in 2012 significant differences were found between the citizens with different levels of education, ethnicity and sex. With the increase in the level of education, there is a decline in the possibility to highly assess the organization of the fellow citizens from one's own neighborhood - 40.37% of those with lower education said that their neighbors get organized constantly or often, in contrast to 28.97% of those with secondary and 21.45% of those with higher education. In 2012, 39.70% of the Albanians, as opposed to 26.81% of the Macedonians said that their neighbors often or constantly help each other and although when all the sociodemographic variables are controlled the difference in the average assessments is only significant in 2012, it forms a consistent pattern through the years, and it can lead to the conclusion that **Ethnic Albanians perceive their neighbors as more organized than ethnic Macedonians**. Although it disappears with the years, in 2012 increased organization among the neighbors in the neighborhood or residential area was observed by men, 31.68% of whom, in contrast to 26.49% of women, said that the neighbors get organized often or constantly. **In the period between 2014 and 2016, a difference can also be observed between the residents of rural and urban areas, and it can be concluded that the inhabitants of villages perceive their neighbors as more organized than the inhabitants of Skopje and the smaller towns**. It is worth mentioning that among the residents of Skopje, although in 2012 32.80% said that their neighbors help each other often or constantly, in 2016, only a fifth (20%) gave one of these two answers. In addition, in 2016 there are also significant differences between the residents of the different regions - the probability of highly assessing their neighbors' organization is highest among the residents of the Polog Region, and lowest among the residents of the Southwest Region.


TABLE 19. NEIGHBORS' ORGANIZATION WITHIN THEIR TOWNS/VILLAGES

How often do the people from your town/village get together, i.e. get organized in order to improve the town/village?

	2012		2013		2014		2015		2016	
	f	Valid %								
Constantly	97	8,5	95	8,7	104	9,1	112	9,7	106	9,1
Often	261	23,0	164	15,0	250	21,8	184	16,0	217	18,6
Rarely	627	55,1	535	49,0	599	52,3	618	53,6	602	51,6
Never	152	13,4	297	27,2	193	16,8	238	20,7	241	20,7
Total valid	1137	100,0	1091	100,0	1146	100,0	1152	100,0	1166	100,0
Unanswered	72		29		41		63		70	
Total	1209		1120		1187		1215		1236	

Similarly to the assessment of the organization on the level of a neighborhood or residential area, **most of the citizens, or more than half of them, believe that their fellow citizens rarely get together in order to improve their town or village.** The average assessment of the level of organization of the neighbors from the town/village is highest in 2012 and significantly declines in 2013, to go significantly up again in 2014.

GRAPH 21. NEIGHBORS' ORGANIZATION WITHIN THEIR TOWNS/VILLAGES



When it comes to the level of organization on the level of a town/village, in 2012 differences were found between the respondents from various regions, and the probability to give a higher assessment of the organization of their fellow citizens was highest among the respondents from the Pelagonija Region. Consistently to the findings about the differences between the citizens from the urban and rural areas when it comes to the level of organization on the level of the neighborhood/residential area, in 2013 and 2014, the village residents gave a higher assessment to their neighbors' organization within their town/village, in contrast to the residents of Skopje and other towns. **It can**

be emphasized that the assessments of the level of organization across the years vary the most among the residents of Skopje, and it is worth mentioning that although in 2013 only 19.91% of the residents of Skopje said that their fellow-citizens often or constantly get organized, in 2014 31.46% gave one of these two answers.


TABLE 20. ORGANIZING INITIATIVES FOR THE COMMON GOOD IN MACEDONIA

Do (And how often do) the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia engage in CIVIC INITIATIVES for the common good?

	2012		2013		2014		2015		2016	
	f	Valid %								
Constantly	89	8,2	91	8,8	124	11,2	119	10,6	115	10,2
Often	230	21,1	194	18,7	271	24,5	237	21,1	265	23,4
Rarely	642	58,9	617	59,4	603	54,5	634	56,4	628	55,5
Never	129	11,8	137	13,2	108	9,8	135	12,0	123	10,9
Total valid	1090	100,0	1039	100,0	1106	100,0	1125	100,0	1131	100,0
Unanswered	119		81		81		90		105	
Total	1209		1120		1187		1215		1236	

The majority, or more than half of the respondents, believe that the citizens in Macedonia rarely engage in civic initiatives for the common good. The average assessment was highest in 2014, and it significantly differs from the average assessment in 2013, but does not significantly change in 2015 and 2016.

GRAPH 22. ORGANIZING INITIATIVES FOR THE COMMON GOOD IN MACEDONIA



During all of the years of research significant differences occur according to ethnicity, and ethnic Macedonians tend to give a higher assessment to the level of organization on a national level. In 2016, 35.24% of ethnic Macedonians said that their fellow-citizens constantly or often take part in

initiatives for improvement of Macedonia, while these two answers were given by 23.98% of ethnic Albanians. Although minor, in 2012 and 2014 there were also differences according to the level of education, and during both of these years the people with higher education gave the lowest assessment of the frequency of initiatives for the common good on the level of Macedonia. In 2014, the average assessment of the frequency of civic initiatives increased among the youth which leads to significant differences between them and the older respondents. 42.35% of the youth, in contrast to 33.08% of the older respondents believed that civic initiatives took place constantly or often in 2014, but the differences disappeared in 2015 and 2016 when around a third of both age groups gave one of these two answers. Finally, in 2014 and 2016, women on average assessed more frequent civic engagement when compared to men. The discrepancy is more prominent in 2016 when 38.01% of the women believed that civic initiatives take place (often or constantly) in contrast to 28.25% of the men.

Construction of the indicator “community organization for civic initiatives”

The extracted component “community organization for civic initiatives” explains for 58.09% of the variance in the answers to the questions about the neighbors’ organization within the neighborhood/residential area, town/village and Macedonia. The internal consistency according to Cronbach’s $\alpha = .64$ is lower than the conventional value for satisfactory reliability. The coefficients for correlation move within the range of $r = .26 - .50$, whereby the correlation between the variables for level of organization within the town/village and the neighborhood/residential area is highest, and the correlation between the level of organization within the neighborhood, residential area and Macedonia, is lowest.

The aggregate indicator of “the level of community organization for civic initiatives” is constructed as a mean value of the three measured variables on the level of organization within the neighborhood/residential area, town/village and Macedonia.



CIVIC INITIATIVES FOR COMMUNITY IMPROVEMENT AND THE COMMON GOOD?

We saw that about one in every three respondents in the period from 2012 to 2016 assesses that the Macedonian citizens often or constantly join in to improve their own communities. Consistently with these findings, the answers to the question about the personal engagement of citizens also paint a bleak picture of civic engagement in the Republic of Macedonia. The data about the answers to the question about personal engagement in civic initiatives and the types of civic initiatives are displayed in tables 12 and 22 and in graphs 23 and 24.


TABLE 21. PERSONAL ENGAGEMENT IN COMMON GOOD INITIATIVES IN MACEDONIA

Have you been a part of a civic initiative in this past year?

	2012		2013		2014		2015		2016	
	f	Valid %								
Yes	264	22,3	300	26,8	388	32,9	391	32,3	379	30,7
No	922	77,7	818	73,2	793	67,1	820	67,7	854	69,3
Total valid	1186	100,0	1118	100,0	1181	100,0	1211	100,0	1233	100,0
Unanswered	23		2		6		4		3	
Total	1209		1120		1187		1215		1236	

In 2012, slightly more than a fifth of the citizens said that they had participated in a civic initiatives, while in 2013 the percentage of active citizens indicates that every fourth citizen had participated in a civic initiative. **The civic engagement underwent a significant increase from 2013 to 2014 when 32.9% or nearly a third of the respondents said that they had been a part of some kind of a civic initiative, but this figure did not significantly change after 2014.**

GRAPH 23. Engagement in civic initiatives: 2012 to 2016



The probability for engagement in civic initiatives among citizens aged 16 to 66 in the period from 2012 to 2016 is most consistently determined by sex, the level of education and the place of residence. In the period from 2013 to 2016, men took part in civic initiatives more often than women and this disproportion remains stable through the years. For example, in 2016 36.27% of the men, in contrast to 25.28% of the women confirmed that they had taken part in civic initiatives for improvement of the country. Although people with higher education give a lower assessment of the level of civic organization on a national level, the likelihood to engage is higher among them when compared to those respondents with a lower education in 2012, 2013 and 2015. In 2015, 44.79% of the people with higher education took part in civic initiatives in contrast to 27.76% of those with secondary education and 21.71% of those with primary education. In 2013, significant differences occur according to the place of residence and based on the respondents' affirmative answers, the civic initiatives were more frequent in villages (32.45% in villages in contrast to 25.37% in Skopje and 23.39% in the remaining towns), although the absolute differences disappear by 2016 (30.37% in villages in comparison to 31.56% in Skopje and 30.35% in the remaining towns). Consistently with the established ethnic differences with regards to the perceptions of civic participation, in 2016 differences also occur when it comes to the personal engagement between the ethnic groups, and there is higher likelihood for engagement among ethnic Macedonians, 32.74% of whom confirmed that they had been a part of the civic initiative, in contrast to 25.81% of the ethnic Albanians. In 2012 and 2013 the likelihood for engagement is also determined by the income. In 2012, the people with income from 15 to 20 thousand MKD (32.87%) were those who engaged most often, while those with an income lower than 5 thousand MKD (15.45%) engaged the least. In 2013, on the other hand, the likelihood for engagement was lowest among the citizens with an income ranging from 5 to 10 thousand MKD (19.44%), and highest among the people with an income higher than 20,000 MKD (42.31%). **Finally, during all years of research, those who have a job engage more often than the unemployed, although this difference reaches statistic significance only in 2013 when 34.22% of those who had a job gave an affirmative answer, in contrast to 20.24% of the unemployed.** These findings may serve to prove the counter-intuitive thesis that the unemployed citizens (despite the assumed surplus of free time) are simply less involved in all social developments, including civic initiatives.

Only a small part of those (also very few) respondents who said that they had participated in an initiative, gave information about the type of initiative they were involved in.


TABLE 22. TYPES OF CIVIC INITIATIVES

What kind of an initiative were you involved in?

	2013 (300)*		2014 (388)*		2015 (391)*		2016 (379)*	
	f	% of respondents						
Afforestation	92	30,7	63	16,2	58	14,8	82	21,6
Organized repair of infrastructure (roads, water-supply, sewerage etc.)	96	32,0	121	31,2	106	27,1	118	31,1
Waste cleaning and collecting actions	126	42,0	136	35,1	122	31,2	108	28,5
Protests	21	7,0	11	2,8	39	10,0	46	12,1
Humanitarian actions	67	22,3	84	21,6	98	25,1	72	19,0
Culture - sport - education	/	/	/	/	52	13,3	52	13,7
Political - party	/	/	/	/	19	4,9	18	4,7
Initiative for economic development	/	/	/	/	12	3,1	9	2,4
Other	28	9,3	76	19,6	34	8,7	38	10,0

* Number of citizens who said that they had participated in civic initiatives for the common good during the previous year

Out of those respondents who said that they had participated in civic initiatives, consistently in all the years of research, the largest percentage of them took part on environmental actions related to cleaning and collecting waste, afforestation, or organized repairs of infrastructure (roads, water-supply, sewerage, etc.) while the engagement in humanitarian actions is relevant for 19% to 25.1% of the citizens who said that they had engaged in civic initiatives.

GRAPH 24. TYPE OF CIVIC INITIATIVES

INSTITUTION



CIVIC ACTIVISM IN THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

Engagement in civic initiatives for improvement of society is not the only way to achieve civic engagement. Citizens may get directly involved in the decision-making and in improving society as individuals. Therefore, apart from the question on whether the respondents had taken part in a civic initiative for the common good, where the emphasis was on working together with one's own neighbors and fellow-citizens towards a common goal, the respondents were also asked whether they had got in touch with the institutions of the government (plus political parties) in order to settle a certain social problem as individuals. More specifically, they were to answer whether in the past year they had got in touch with:

- the mayor or a councilor from their municipality;
- a member of parliament;
- a minister;
- a government representative; or
- a political party.

in order to settle a given social problem as individuals.

Furthermore, the respondents were asked whether in the past year they had


- participated at a public hearing, i.e. meeting on local issues;
- participated in a protest, demonstration or public gathering;
- signed a petition;
- submitted a proposal or a complaint;
- were involved in a discussion working group within the municipality.

Thus we covered a wide range of possibilities for civic engagement which we labeled civic activism and we were able to see which were the most frequent types of civic activism, what the relationship between the various types of activism was and which were, i.e. whether there were any differences between the various groups of citizens and their mechanisms of choice in order to influence the social changes. The data from the answers to the questions on civic activism is displayed in tables 23 and 23 and graphs 25 and 26.

TABLE 23. CIVIC ACTIVISM BY CONTACTING INSTITUTION REPRESENTATIVES

	2012		2013		2014		2015		2016	
	f	% of respondents								
Mayor/councilor	276	22,8	244	21,8	279	23,5	243	20,0	260	21,0
Member of parliament	88	7,3	109	9,7	134	11,3	112	9,2	108	8,7
Minister	42	3,5	53	4,7	66	5,6	60	4,9	61	4,9
Government representative	55	4,5	131	11,7	151	12,7	161	13,3	143	11,6
Political party	115	9,5	174	15,5	209	17,6	169	13,9	153	12,4
Total	576		711		839		745		725	

GRAPH 25. CIVIC ACTIVISM BY CONTACTING INSTITUTION REPRESENTATIVES




What immediately strikes us from the data in table 23 is that the situation with civic engagement in Macedonia is at a very low level. Apart from the contact with the municipalities in which they live, Macedonian citizens very rarely try to deal with a given problem individually, by contacting the institutions. **In the period from 2012 to 2016, in order to deal with social issues, on average, the municipality was contacted by nearly every fifth citizen, the MPs were contacted by less than a tenth of the citizens, while the government representatives, i.e. ministers, were contacted by an average of less than 5% of the citizens. It is worth observing that in order to settle a given social problem, consistently through the years of research, the citizens are more likely to contact the political parties than the elected representatives.**

TABLE 24. CIVIC ACTIVISM BY ACTIVITY

Activism through	2012		2013		2014		2015		2016	
	f	% of respondents								
1. Taking part in a public hearing, a meeting on local problems.	194	16,0	177	15,8	204	17,2	177	14,6	216	17,5
2. Participating in a protest, demonstration, public gathering.	100	8,3	119	10,6	153	12,9	254	20,9	219	17,7
3. Signing a petition.	107	8,9	108	9,6	136	11,5	166	13,7	136	11,0
4. Submitting a proposal or a complaint.	108	8,9	105	9,4	141	11,9	110	9,1	105	8,5
5. Involvement in a discussion working group in the municipality.	83	6,9	80	7,1	105	8,8	78	6,4	82	6,6
Total	592		589		739		785		758	

Apart from “contact activism”, the situation with the other types of civic engagement is at a similar, equally invidious level. **In the period between 2012 and 2014, taking part in a public hearing on local problems ranks highest, with an average participation of citizens of 16.3%, but, in 2015 and 2016, the percentage of citizens who said that they had participated in protests, public demonstrations and public gatherings increased, and according to the data 20.9% of the respondents in 2015, and 17.7% of the respondents in 2016 took part in activities of this kind.** This finding consistently reflects the social developments in Macedonia for the past two years, when mass protests took over the country.

GRAPH 26. CIVIC ACTIVISM BY ACTIVITY



Construction of the indicators for civic activism

The dichotomous variables referring to the contacting of representatives of the government, state institutions and political parties as well as the involvement in various activities that operationalized civic activism were subjected to main components analysis of main in order to determine whether subsuming factors could be extracted. Three components were extracted: contact activism, constructive activism etc. hostile or confrontational activism which explain for 58.20% of the variance in the answers. Contact activism is civic activism which is accomplished through communication with the state institutions – most often the local authorities, with MPs and government officials, as well as political parties. The internal consistency of the four items for contact activism is Cronbach’s $\alpha = .76$ and is close to the conventional value for solid reliability. The second component, or constructive activism refers to the participation in groups and public hearings, as well as giving proposals and complaints to the public institutions and requires greater engagement on the part of the citizens. The internal consistency of the items for constructive activism is Cronbach’s $\alpha = .62$. Finally, the last type of activism, which we labeled hostile activism, consists of participation in protest rallies and signing petitions which suggests that there is a high probability that citizens who go out and protest in order to influence the political decisions also use petitions as a means to express their own opinion and influence social changes. The internal consistency for hostile activism is lowest and amounts to Cronbach’s $\alpha = .60$. It is worth mentioning that the extracted factor structure, apart from the data from all the years of research, is also replicated on the samples from every year separately, thus additionally validating the attempt for this kind of conceptualization of civic activism.

In order to distinguish between the active and inactive citizens, the indicators of the three forms of activism were constructed as dichotomous variables of “presence-absence”, whereby the “presence” of the type of activism was determined as involvement in at least one of the activities constituting the component. The data on the frequency of the three types of civic activism are displayed in table 25.

THE RELATIONS AMONG THE VARIOUS TYPES OF CIVIC ACTIVISM AND THE DIFFERENCES AMONG THE VARIOUS SUBGROUPS OF CITIZENS


The probability of contact activism in the period between 2012 and 2016 may be described through a significant U-shaped trend, and we can also see that the percentage of citizens who engaged in contact activism increased until 2014 and then marked a decline until 2016. Although a significant drop can also be observed in constructive activism from 2014 to 2015 as well, the variations through the years of this type of activism are less prominent, and apart from 2014 when a quarter of the citizens said that they had participated in working groups, public hearings, or submitted proposals to public institutions, this type of activism is consistently relevant to only a fifth of citizens through the years of research. Finally, when it comes to the frequency of hostile activism, statistically significant changes may be established from 2014 into 2015, yet contrary to the trend established for the previous two types of activism, in 2015 the participation in protests, demonstrations and public gatherings culminates, and about a quarter of the citizens said that they had engaged in opposing activism. This finding does not come as a surprise, given the fact that this period was marked by tumultuous social events that started with the mass student protests in late 2014 and continued in 2015 with the protests of the civil movement “Protestiram” (I Protest). The frequency of hostile activism, according to the data, plunged in 2016, but this finding must be observed within the context of the period of finalizing the research (29.02 – 08.04.2016) which preceded the mass protests of the so-called Colourful Revolution which started on 12 April 2016.

TABLE 25. CIVIC ACTIVISM

	2012		2013		2014		2015		2016	
	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%
Contact activism (at least one contact with a state/public institution)	334	27.6	350	31.3	418	35.2	376	30.9	362	29.3
Constructive activism (taking part in working groups, public hearings, proposals)	246	20.3	243	21.7	305	25.7	256	21.1	275	22.2
Hostile activism (protest or petition)	174	14.4	192	17.1	218	18.4	319	26.3	266	21.5


On graph 27 it is interesting to observe the “coinciding” of the decline of the cooperative forms of civic activism with the increase in hostile activism in 2015.

GRAPH 27. CIVIC ACTIVISM 2012–2015




The sociodemographic analysis leads to the conclusion that the likelihood of contact activism is consistently determined by the level of education, place of residence and gender identity. Although the probability of contact activism increases with the increase of the level of education quite consistently in the period between 2012 and 2016, in the last year (2016) the differentiation between the people who have completed university education (38.96%) and those with lower education (secondary education 25.85% and primary education 20.32%) is more prominent. The differences in contact activism, according to the place of residence, are significant for all the years of research, but are most prominent in 2012 and 2016, and lowest in 2014, when the engagement was highest among all the groups of citizens, the reason for which may be traced to the early parliamentary elections that year. In comparison, 32.80% of the citizens of Skopje engaged in contact activism in 2014, as opposed to 38.67% of the residents of villages, while in 2016 the percentage of contact activism in Skopje dropped to 21.56%, although this decline was less dramatic in villages and in 2016, 32.75% of the villagers engaged in contact activism. **In 2012, 2013 and 2016, differences also occurred among the age groups, and according to the findings, contact activism was more frequent among the older respondents, which serves as another case in point of the assumption that traditional forms of civic activism are less attractive to the youth.** To illustrate this, in 2016, nearly a third of the older respondents (32.90%) had been involved in contact activism, in contrast to less than a fifth (18.45%) of the youth. Finally, consistently in the period between 2012 to 2016, there was a significant gender gap in contact activism. The gap was biggest in 2015 when 38.70% of the men had contacted at least one of the public officials and representatives of the public institutions, as opposed to 23.33% of the women. However, when we take into consideration the gender differences, it is desirable to emphasize the interaction with the age groups, i.e. the fact that the gender differences are lower among those younger than 29 (see graph 28). **In 2016 20% of the men and 16.78% of the women younger than 29 engaged in contact activism, while this discrepancy is dramatically more prominent among the citizens older than 29, and it can be seen that 40.62% of the men, in contrast to 25.52% of the women engaged in contact activism.**

GRAPH 28. GENDER DIFFERENCES IN CIVIC ACTIVISM AMONG THE YOUNGER AND OLDER CITIZENS: 2012-2016




Similar patterns of relations were also identified when it comes to constructive activism. The likelihood of constructive activism during all of the years of research was higher among men, with a highest discrepancy in 2014, when the probability of engagement was more than twice higher (2.29) among men, in contrast to women. However, the same conclusion when it comes to the gap in the engagement of the genders when intersected with age can also be drawn with regards to constructive activism (see graph 29). For example, in 2016, among citizens older than 29, 31.63% of the men, in contrast to 17.30% of the women said that they had engaged in constructive activism, while a much lower gap can be observed among the citizens younger than 29, with 18.21% of men and 14.09% of women engaging in constructive activism.

GRAPH 29. GENDER DIFFERENCES IN CIVIC ACTIVISM AMONG THE YOUNGER AND OLDER CITIZENS: 2012-2016



Similarities with the findings on contact activism may also be observed with regards to the comparison of respondents with different levels of education. **The increase in the level of education also increases the probability of engagement in all the years of research other than 2014.** The differences were the highest in 2016, when the likelihood of engagement among respondents with university education was as much as four times higher (4.12) than among people with lower education. Minor differences have also been recorded according to the place of residence and it is worth mentioning that **residents of villages have a higher likelihood of engaging in constructive activism in comparison to the residents of towns in 2012, 2013, and 2016.** For example, until 2016, according to the respondents' answers, 25.56% of the village inhabitants, in contrast to 19.69% of the inhabitants of Skopje said that they had engaged in constructive activism. **In 2015 and 2016 differences also occurred related to the income, and the likelihood of activism in 2015 was significantly higher among the people with income higher than 20 thousand MKD, in comparison to all other incomes lower than 15,000, while in 2016, the likelihood of engagement was higher among all the groups of citizens with income higher than 10,000 MKD, in comparison to those earning from 5 to 10 thousand MKD.** This means that constructive activism increases among citizens with income from 10 to 15 thousand MKD, and for example, if in 2015, 19.66% of them engaged in constructive activism, in 2016 this percentage increased to 26.07%. It is worth mentioning that when all sociodemographic characteristics are controlled, in constructive activism, unlike the case with contact activism, the difference between the engagement of the younger and older citizens is only significant in 2013, when 24.27% of the older citizens, in contrast to 14.53% of the younger ones were involved in constructive activism.

When it comes to hostile activism, the likelihood for participation is most consistently determined by the level of education. Similarly to constructive activism, in all the years of research, apart from 2014, the probability of engagement increased with the increase in the level of education. The discrepancy was highest in 2015, when 38.86% of the people with university education, in contrast to 14.20% of those with primary education and 22.05% of the citizens with secondary education said that they had engaged in hostile activism. Differences according to the ethnicity occurred in 2013 - there is a higher likelihood among ethnic Macedonians to engage in hostile activities, in comparison to ethnic Albanians. It also worth noting that although in 2015 the difference in the engagement of the ethnic groups amounted to 8.62 percent points, when all the socio-demographic variables are controlled, the ethnicity does not significantly predicts engagement in hostile activities. **Finally, in 2015 and 2016 differences also occurred among the age groups. In fact, contrary to the established pattern of cooperative forms of youth engagement, when it comes to hostile activism there is greater likelihood for engagement among the youth.** The differences culminated in 2015, when 36.94% of the youth, in contrast to 22.22% of the older citizens engaged in hostile activism. **It can be stressed, that when it comes to engagement in hostile activism, in those cases when all the sociodemographic characteristics are controlled, no recorded differences were found among men and women in any of the years of research, which indicates that the gender gap in civic activism only exists in its more conventional forms.**



CONVENTIONAL CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA: VOTING AT THE ELECTIONS

As the survey in 2012 was conducted several months before the local elections, it omitted the questions related to conventional engagement, i.e. voting at the elections. This was done in order to avoid raising suspicions among the respondents about possible dishonest intentions of the survey and its relation to the already scheduled elections, and not civic engagement. In 2013 and 2014 there was no similar issue, so we added a question on conventional engagement:

1. How often have you voted in the past?
2. Will you vote at the next elections? (regardless of what kind of elections were in question)
3. How important is voting at the elections to you? (regardless of whether you have the right to vote at the moment)


The data on the answers to the three questions about conventional civic engagement are displayed in tables 26, 27 and 28, and in graphs 30, 31 and 32. The average assessments of the validity of voting do not change significantly in the period between 2012 and 2016 and an average of 68% of the citizens find that is partially or very important for them to vote.

TABLE 26. IMPORTANCE OF THE POSSIBILITY TO VOTE
How important is it to you personally, to vote at the elections?
(regardless of whether you have the right to vote at the moment)

	2013		2014		2015		2016	
	f	Valid %						
Voting is not important to you at all	158	14,3	162	13,7	165	13,7	182	14,8
Voting is not very important to you	74	6,7	75	6,4	57	4,7	57	4,6
Voting is partially important to you	138	12,5	151	12,8	154	12,8	133	10,8
Voting is important to you	243	22,0	273	23,2	299	24,9	294	24,0
Voting is very important to you	491	44,5	518	43,9	526	43,8	561	45,7
Total	1104	100,0	1179	100,0	1201	100,0	1227	100,0

The sociodemographic comparisons indicate that the importance of voting is consistently affected by the age groups of the respondents. In 2014, 71.88% of the citizens older than 29 said that it is important or very important for them to vote, as opposed to 57.27% of those younger than 29.

GRAPH 30. IMPORTANCE OF THE POSSIBILITY TO VOTE




The past voter turnout according to the citizens' statement for the period between 2012 and 2016 does not significantly change, and on average 79.82% said that they had voted at all, or nearly all of the elections. This means that an average of eight out of ten citizens voted at all the elections, yet what is indicative, is that this rate visibly differs from the official data on voter turnout, according to which, only 1,120,744 citizens voted, for example at the early elections in 2014, i.e. the voter turnout was 63%.

TABLE 27. PAST ELECTION TURNOUT
How often have you voted in the past?

	2013		2014		2015		2016	
	f	Valid %						
I haven't voted	37	3,4	31	2,7	45	3,9	41	3,5
At some of the elections	83	7,7	88	7,8	107	9,2	92	7,8
At most of the elections	96	8,9	94	8,3	106	9,1	101	8,5
At nearly all of the elections	867	80,1	917	81,2	903	77,8	948	80,2
Total valid	1083	100,0	1130	100,0	1161	100,0	1182	100,0

GRAPH 31. PAST TURNOUT




As expected, the assessments of the consistency of the past turnout differs between the younger and older respondents and consistently, during all the years of research, the older ones assessed the past turnout as higher. The highest discrepancy occurred in 2015 when 82.99% of the older respondents said that they had voted at all or nearly all of the elections, in contrast to 61.75% of the younger ones. In 2016 differences were recorded among the citizens with different levels of education and different ethnicity – those with higher education and ethnic Macedonians gave a higher assessment to their own turnout at the past elections (compared to those with lower education and ethnic Albanians), although the differences are superfluous if it is taken into account that most of the citizens, regardless of their sociodemographic background, said that they had voted at all of the elections.

The certainty in the intent for future voter turnout also did not significantly change in the period between 2012 and 2016, and on average 69.62% of the citizens stated that they will certainly vote at the following elections.

TABLE 28. FUTURE TURNOUT
Will you vote at the next elections?

	2013		2014		2015		2016	
	f	Valid %						
Certainly no	59	5,4	52	4,5	69	5,8	72	5,9
Most probably no	37	3,4	37	3,2	52	4,4	28	2,3
Maybe	117	10,6	115	10,0	147	12,3	156	12,7
Yes, most probably	123	11,2	139	12,1	114	9,5	101	8,3
Yes, certainly	765	69,5	807	70,2	812	68,0	867	70,8
Total valid	1101	100,0	1150	100,0	1194	100,0	1224	100,0

GRAPH 32. FUTURE TURNOUT



Similarly to the assessment of previous turnover, the assessments of future turnover were most consistently predicted by the belonging to one of the two age groups, and in the period between 2014 and 2016, the youth were less certain in their intention to vote, in contrast to their older fellow-citizens. The differences are stable through the years, and in 2016, 73.72% of the older citizens, in contrast to 62.05% of the youth said that they would certainly vote at the following elections.

In summary, the findings about the voting behaviour corroborate the authors' standpoints (e.g. Bennett, Wells, & Rank, 2007) who suggest that the youth are less interested in conventional civic engagement, although as it can be seen from their answers in this comparative study, the youth are not uninterested, and more than half of them said that they had voted at nearly all elections up to that point, and would certainly vote at the following elections.

Construction of the indicator “Consistency in voting behaviour”

The extracted component “consistency in the voting behaviour” explains for 63.77% of the variance in the answers to the question about the importance of the right to vote, the past and future voting behaviour. The internal consistency according to Cronbach's $\alpha = .69$ is lower than the conventional value for solid reliability. The coefficient of correlation between the variables are within the range $r = .38 - .51$, and according to their size they can be labeled as moderate to high. There is highest correlation between future voting and the importance of voting, and the lowest correlation is between the importance of voting and past voting.

The aggregated indicator “voting behaviour” was constructed as a mean value of the three measured variables: importance of voting, past and future voting.



VOLUNTEERING IN THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

Volunteering is a key part of civic engagement, oftentimes even used synonymously to civic engagement. It is closely related to civic initiatives, because they are a sort of volunteering themselves. Volunteering is most frequently used to deal with certain problems within the community (identically to initiatives); however, volunteering has a broader scope. Volunteering also covers actions for practical help to groups or fellow-citizens, as well as organizing events within the community. In that way, the volunteers directly participate in the life of the community – the reason why volunteering is synonymous with civic engagement.

In our study, volunteering was measured through a list of ways of providing free financial aid, and the respondents were asked to state whether they had given such help or not. We did this in order to be certain that all of the respondents were referring to the same type of volunteerism, i.e. in order to avoid free interpretation of the concept of volunteering.

Among other things, we distinguished between (free) aid by organizations, clubs and associations in the shape of formal, traditional volunteering, and informal volunteering, i.e. help to fellow citizens (that the respondents were not related to), as a separate type of volunteering one's own time which does not fall under the traditional concept of volunteering.


In the part that follows, we first consider the frequency of membership in organizations and clubs (table 29), and then based on the list of activities through which were operationalized the ways of providing free assistance (tables 31 and 34), the indices that represent formal (table 32) and informal volunteering (Table 35) are given. In addition, the rate of practice for both forms of volunteering, are shown in tables 33 and 36.

TABLE 29. MEMBERSHIP IN ORGANIZATIONS, GROUPS AND CLUBS
Have you been a member of an organization, group or a club in this past year?

	2012		2013		2014		2015		2016	
	f	Valid %								
Yes	213	18,3	186	16,6	253	21,3	210	17,3	257	20,8
No	952	81,7	934	83,4	934	78,7	1005	82,7	979	79,2
Total valid	1165	100,0	1120	100,0	1187	100,0	1215	100,0	1236	100,0

The percentage of citizens who were members of an organization, group or club does not significantly change in the period between 2012 and 2016 and it can be said that on average less than a fifth of the citizens donated their time in so-called traditional volunteering.

GRAPH 33. MEMBERSHIP IN ORGANIZATIONS, GROUPS AND CLUBS: 2012 TO 2016



Consistently in the period between 2013 and 2016, the youth were more frequently members of organizations and clubs. The absolute differences are highest in 2014, when 31.52% of the respondents younger than 29 said that they had participated, as opposed to 17.39% of their older fellow-citizens. The pattern of differences between men and women is also consistent in the period from 2012 to 2016 - men are more often involved in local organizations and clubs, and the differences are highest in 2014 when 26.38% of the male respondents gave an affirmative answer, in contrast to 16.16% of the women. In the period from 2013 to 2015, there are significant differences according to the amount of the income, and according to the findings, the likelihood for membership is highest among the citizens with income higher than 20,000 MKD. The gap is most prominent in 2014 when 34.18% of the people with income higher than 20,000 MKD said that they are members in organizations and clubs, in contrast to 15.32% of the citizens within income from 5 to 10 thousand MKD. Finally, the likelihood for membership in organizations or clubs is different among people with a different level of formal education, and the differences are most prominent in 2016 when a third (33%) of the people with university education said they had been members in contrast to 15.33% of the citizens with secondary and 13.37% of the citizens with primary education.

TABLE 30. TYPES OF ORGANIZATIONS, GROUPS OR CLUBS

What kind of an organization, group, or club are you a member of?

	2013 *(186)		2014 *(121)		2015 *(210)		2016 *(257)	
	f	% of respondents						
Women's organizations	15	8,06	9	3,56	8	3,81	19	7,39
Organizations for retirees	7	3,76	5	1,98	12	5,71	5	1,95
Youth organizations	12	6,45	10	3,95	16	7,62	19	7,39
Sports, hunting and fishing organizations	39	20,97	51	20,16	46	21,90	64	24,90
Humanitarian organizations (including the Red Cross)	34	18,28	50	19,76	52	24,76	65	25,29
Non-governmental organizations from the area of culture	15	8,06	17	6,72	14	6,67	23	8,95
Non-governmental organizations from the area of democracy and human rights	17	9,14	14	5,53	12	5,71	16	6,23
Scouts	0	0,00	2	0,79	1	0,48	1	0,39

* Number of respondents who are members in organizations, groups and clubs.

Of those citizens who were members of some organization or club, as can be seen from table 30 (and graph 35), most or an average of more than one in five during the reporting period, were members of humanitarian organizations (21.98%) and sports, hunting and fishing organizations (22.2%).

The most common form of free assistance that the members provide for their organizations is advisory (giving information or advice) or help in the organization of events, while the rarest is administrative assistance concerning accounting or office management.

TABLE 31. TYPES OF FREE HELP FOR ORGANIZATIONS AMONG MEMBERS OF ORGANIZATIONS

In the past 12 months, have you provided UNPAID help to your or any other organization or club, in any of the following ways?

	2012		2013		2014		2015		2016	
	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%
Collecting or handling money in your or in other organizations	76	36,0	54	29,20	87	34,40	80	38,10	96	37,40
Leader of the group or you have been a member of the management	105	49,8	72	38,90	98	38,70	70	33,30	83	32,30
Organizing events or assisting in organization of events	148	70,1	115	62,20	181	71,50	130	61,90	157	61,10
Giving information, consultations, advice	160	76,2	135	73,00	197	77,90	147	70,30	177	68,90
Secretarial, administrative, accounting or office work	66	31,1	47	25,40	58	22,90	49	23,40	63	24,50
Driving or finding transportation	95	45,7	68	36,80	98	38,70	73	34,80	103	40,10
Other practical help (eg buying things, help in school, etc.)	103	49,3	82	44,30	123	48,60	107	51,00	116	45,10

If we make a summary of formal volunteering or volunteering for organizations²², we will see that the percentage of those that volunteered for organizations increased in 2014 when almost half of the citizens (48%) donated time to assist organizations, but then declined after 2014. The prevalence of formal volunteering conceptualized as providing free assistance to organizations of at least one of the above ways is presented in table 32.

TABLE 32. FORMAL VOLUNTEERING

Frequency of formal volunteering as help to organizations among those that are not members of organizations

	2012		2013		2014		2015		2016	
	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%
Formal volunteering/ Helping organizations	427	36,8	/	/	555	47,5	418	35,2	402	32,9
Formal volunteering among the members of the organizations	192	90,1	158	86,3	241	95,6	175	85,8	219	85,9
Formal volunteering among the other members (the ones who are not members of organizations)	235	24,8	/	/	314	34,3	243	24,6	183	18,9

²² Due to the fact that in 2013, the question concerning the ways of giving unpaid help to an organization to those who aren't members, hasn't been placed, a summary index for formal volunteering is not constructed.

Most of the citizens, or an average for the period between 2012 and 2016 of four out of ten (39.36%) get engaged less than once a week, but at least once a month, by offering free assistance to the organization or group/club that they are members of. However, the consistency of formal volunteering is reflected in the data which suggests that three out of ten, or an average of 27.78% of the formal volunteers for the period from 2012 to 2016 volunteer at least once a week. These findings are not consistent with the findings presented in the Strategy for Development and Promotion of Volunteering by the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy (MLSP, 2010) and suggest that most of the formal volunteers are regular volunteers (see Table 33). On average only 4.94% are so-called “one-time” volunteers, who only volunteered once.

TABLE 33. FREQUENCY OF FORMAL VOLUNTEERING AMONG MEMBERS OF ORGANIZATIONS, GROUPS AND CLUBS

How often did you help this group/organization/club, i.e. these organizations/groups/clubs in the past 12 months?

	2012		2013		2014		2015		2016	
	f	Valid %								
At least once a week	63	32,3	32	19,9	55	24,6	41	35,3	37	26,8
Not as often as once a week, but not less than once a month	73	37,4	66	41,0	85	37,9	37	31,9	67	48,6
Less than once a month	55	28,2	56	34,8	72	32,1	28	24,1	28	20,3
Just once	4	2,1	7	4,3	12	5,4	10	8,6	6	4,3
Total	195	100	161	100	224	100	116	100	138	100

Unlike formal, informal volunteering in the Republic of Macedonia has a much better rank. In all the years of research, most of the citizens, or an average of 68.02% donated (e.g. blood, clothes, money...), and least of them provided personal care to a sick or weak person (24.76% on average for all the years of research), or represented someone (e.g. in the municipality or at the doctor's) (an average of 24.2% for all the years of research).

TABLE 34. ACTIVITIES FOR INFORMAL VOLUNTEERING

In the past 12 months, have you done any of the following things for free, for someone who is not related to you?

	2012		2013		2014		2015		2016	
	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%
1. Contact with a person who has a difficulty getting out of the home	483	40,0	483	43,1	543	45,7	536	44,1	527	42,6
2. Grocery-shopping, taking the pension or paying the bills	465	38,5	448	40,0	495	41,7	487	40,1	457	37,0
3. Cooking, cleaning, laundering, gardening or other routine household chores	414	34,2	443	39,6	422	35,6	368	30,3	339	27,4
4. Decorating, or other types of repairs in the home, or of a vehicle	457	37,8	480	42,9	446	37,6	416	34,2	397	32,1
5. Taking care of children	369	30,5	355	31,7	415	35,0	374	30,8	359	29,0
6. Personal care for a sick or weak person	305	25,2	299	26,7	277	23,3	294	24,2	301	24,4
7. Caring for a home of pet while the owners are away	453	37,5	432	38,6	455	38,3	384	31,6	385	31,1
8. Signing letters or filling in documents	447	37,0	472	42,1	551	46,4	441	36,3	513	41,5
9. Representing someone (e.g. in the municipality, or at the doctor's)	316	26,1	305	27,2	290	24,4	291	24,0	238	19,3
10. Driving or accompanying (e.g. to the airport, in the hospital or for a walk)	506	41,9	557	49,7	572	48,2	519	42,7	586	47,4
11. Donations (e.g. of blood, of money...)	649	53,7	740	66,1	894	75,3	891	73,3	886	71,7

It is also evident that in the period between 2012 and 2016, a high average of 87.98% of the citizens helped a friend or a stranger by doing at least one of the above-mentioned acts that we used to operationalize informal volunteering.

TABLE 35. INFORMAL VOLUNTEERING

At least one of the listed activities for helping individuals

	2012		2013		2014		2015		2016	
	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%
Yes	979	82,4	990	88,6	1084	91,6	1071	88,7	1085	88,6
No	209	17,6	128	11,4	99	8,4	137	11,3	139	11,4
Total	1188	100,0	1118	100,0	1183	100,0	1208	100,0	1224	100,0

The percent of informal volunteers significantly changes from 2012 to 2013.

GRAPH 34. INFORMAL VOLUNTEERING: 2012 TO 2016



Informal volunteering is more frequent among citizens, however, from the data in table 34 it can be concluded that most of the citizens rarely practice it (on average 50.17% in the period between 2012 and 2014) or when necessary (on average 62.45% from 2015 to 2016).

TABLE 36 . FREQUENCY OF INFORMAL VOLUNTEERING

How often have you individually helped someone else in the past 12 months through one of the listed activities?

	2012		2013		2014		2015		2016	
	f	Valid %	f	Valid %	f	Valid %	f	Valid %	f	Valid %
At least once a week	178	18,4	114	10,2	157	14,0	85	8,0	90	8,3
Less than once a week, but at least once a month	311	32,2	308	27,5	297	26,5	157	14,7	165	15,2
Less than once a month	477	49,4	563	50,3	569	50,8	146	13,7	164	15,2
When necessary	/	/	134	12,0	97	8,7	678	63,6	663	61,3
Total	966	100,0	1119	100,0	1120	100,0	1066	100,0	1082	100,0

The sociodemographic comparisons suggest that the differences between the difference groups of citizens are trivial and that most of them have volunteered by doing at least one of the listed activities regardless of their demographic background.



PREDICTING ENGAGEMENT IN CIVIC INITIATIVES AND CIVIC ACTIVISM

In order to determine what is important for predicting the engagement in civic activism and in the three forms of civic activism, three hierarchical logistic regressions were performed. In all regressive analyses, in the first block we entered the sociodemographic variables and the year of research, while in the second block we entered the aggregate variables referring to the standpoints towards the community, the belief about the possibilities to act and its justification, as well as the consistency of the voting behaviour as a traditional form of civic engagement, and finally the engagement through formal and informal volunteering. The hierarchical input was convenient to see whether and to what extent the empirical constructs, which are conceptually related to civic engagement and civic activism in literature, will increase the predictive value after the sociodemographic variables are taken into consideration and the variations from one into the other year of research are controlled. Although the statistics based on which the predictive value of the sociodemographic variables can be inferred are presented below, their role is not commented on, because the differences between the citizens with different sociodemographic background were previously interpreted for each of the years of research separately.

Predicting engagement in civic initiatives

The model in which only the sociodemographic variables and the year of research are entered is significant $\chi^2(22) = 139,941, p = .000$, and explains between 5 (Cox & Snell $R^2 = 0,05$) and 7 (Nagelkerke $R^2 = 0,07$) percent of the variance in engagement in civic initiatives. The Hosmer–Lemeshow test for goodness of fit is insignificant, which additionally indicates that the model is good. $\chi^2(8) = 11,870, p = .157$. The model in which the aggregate variables are also entered, apart from the sociodemographic variables and the year of research is also significant $\chi^2(35) = 472,864, p = .000$ and increases the explained variance to 17 (Cox & Snell $R^2 = 0,17$), in fact 23 (Nagelkerke $R^2 = 0,23$) percent. Once again, the Hosmer–Lemeshow test for goodness of fit is insignificant, which indicates that the model is good $\chi^2(8) = 2,908, p = .940$.

In table 37 we have the values for the regressive coefficients, the odds ratio and their 95% confidence intervals, based on which we can assess the specific predictive value of each of the input variables.

TABLE 37. PREDICTING ENGAGEMENT IN CIVIC INITIATIVES

Predictor:	B	S.E.	OR	95% CI OR	
<i>First step</i>					
Year (2013)					
1. 2014	,18	,12	1,19	,94	1,52
2. 2015	,14	,12	1,15	,90	1,47
3. 2016	,22	,12	1,24	,97	1,58
Age groups (youth)	-,17	,10	,84	,69	1,04
Education (primary)					
1. Secondary education	,16	,14	1,17	,89	1,54
2. University education	**,.53	,16	1,70	1,24	2,32
Ethnicity (Macedonians)	**,.60	,14	1,82	1,39	2,40

Predictor:	B	S.E.	OR	95% CI OR	
Sex (Men)	** ,49	,09	1,63	1,37	1,94
Place of residence (village)					
1. Skopje	-,35	,22	,71	,46	1,08
2. Another town	**-,59	,11	,55	,45	,68
Status on the labour market (employed)	,15	,11	1,16	,94	1,43
Region (Skopje)					
1. Vardar	,07	,25	1,08	,66	1,75
2. East	,01	,24	1,01	,63	1,61
3. Southwest	,06	,23	1,06	,68	1,67
4. Southeast	,01	,24	1,01	,63	1,61
5. Pelagonija	-,10	,23	,91	,58	1,41
6. Polog	,03	,23	1,03	,65	1,62
7. Northeast	,03	,25	1,03	,63	1,67
Monthly income (up to 5 thousand MKD)					
1. From 5,000 to 10,000 MKD	**-,37	,14	,69	,53	,91
2. From 10.000 to 15.000 MKD	-,17	,14	,84	,64	1,11
3. From 15,000 to 20,000 MKD	,02	,16	1,02	,74	1,40
4. Over 20,000 MKD	,23	,16	1,26	,92	1,73
Second step					
Neighbor benevolence (-)					
1. inconsistent answer	-,14	,12	,87	,68	1,11
2. (+)	-,06	,16	,94	,68	1,29
Possibility to influence	** ,27	,06	1,30	1,16	1,47
Will for involvement (-)					
1. inconsistent answer	,22	,13	1,24	,97	1,59
2. (+)	** ,42	,13	1,52	1,16	1,98
Level of organization of the community	** ,67	,08	1,94	1,67	2,26
Belonging	,15	,09	1,16	,98	1,38
Satisfaction with the place of residence	-,02	,09	,98	,83	1,16
Evaluating the changes (+)					
1. (-)	,12	,14	1,12	,86	1,46
2. inconsistent answer	-,11	,12	,89	,71	1,13
Voting behaviour	,10	,06	1,10	,98	1,24
Membership in organizations (+)	**1,21	,11	3,35	2,69	4,18

Note: B = regression coefficient;
S,E = standard error; OR = odds ratio
* p < .05, ** p < .01,

The likelihood to engage in civic initiatives for the common good increases with the increase in one's own confidence to influence and with the increase in the confidence of the level of collective organization among one's neighbors. The odds for involvement in civic initiatives are 3.35 higher among those who are members of organizations, clubs and groups, and the likelihood of civic participation is also higher among those who said that improving society is a personal responsibility and who expressed will for involvement. In conclusion, when the sociodemographic variables and the year of research are controlled, the engagement in civic initiatives for the common good can significantly be predicted by: the trust in one's own ability to influence, the will for involvement in the community, the assessments of the level of organization of the community, as well as membership into organizations, clubs and groups.

Predicting contact activism

The model in which only the sociodemographic variables and the year of research are entered is significant $\chi^2(22) = 177,695, p = .000$, and explains between 7 (Cox & Snell $R^2 = 0,66$) and 9 (Nagelkerke $R^2 = 0,09$) percent of the variance in contact activism. The Hosmer–Lemeshow test for goodness of fit is insignificant, which additionally indicates that the model is good. $\chi^2(8) = 177,69, p = ,501$. The model in which the aggregate variables are also entered, apart from the sociodemographic variables and the year of research, is also significant $\chi^2(34) = 453,516, p = .000$ and increases the explained variance to 16 (Cox & Snell $R^2 = 0,17$), in fact 22 (Nagelkerke $R^2 = 0,221$) percent. Once again, the Hosmer–Lemeshow test for goodness of fit is insignificant, which indicates that the model is good $\chi^2(8) = 9,576, p = ,296$.

In table 38 we have the values for the regressive coefficients, the odds ratio and their 95% confidence intervals, based on which we can assess the specific predictive value of each of the input variables.

TABLE 38. PREDICTING CONTACT ACTIVISM

Predictor:	B	S.E.	OR	95% CI OR	
<i>First step</i>					
Year (2013)					
1. 2014	,02	,12	1,02	,812	1,294
2. 2015	-,07	,12	0,93	,732	1,179
3. 2016	-,30	,12	0,74	,583	,942
Age groups (youth)	-,45	,11	0,64	,520	,789
Education (primary)					
1. Secondary education	,36	,14	1,44	1,094	1,891
2. University education	,73	,16	2,09	1,523	2,855
Ethnicity (Macedonians)	,31	,14	1,36	1,045	1,781
Sex (Men)	*,46	,09	1,58	1,327	1,875
Place of residence (village)					
1. Skopje	-,43	,22	0,65	,424	1,004
2. Another town	*-,46	,11	0,63	,512	,775
Status on the labour market (employed)	,03	,10	1,03	,839	1,263

Predictor:	B	S.E.	OR	95% CI OR	
Region (Skopje)					
1. Vardar	,24	,25	1,27	,782	2,054
2. East	*,49	,24	1,63	1,021	2,590
3. Southwest	,35	,23	1,43	,909	2,234
4. Southeast	,13	,24	1,14	,713	1,832
5. Pelagonija	,38	,22	1,47	,947	2,273
6. Polog	,35	,23	1,41	,902	2,218
7. Northeast	,23	,25	1,26	,781	2,047
Monthly income (up to 5 thousand MKD)					
1. From 5,000 to 10,000 MKD	,04	,14	1,04	,793	1,353
2. From 10,000 to 15,000 MKD	,29	,14	1,34	1,017	1,764
3. From 15,000 to 20,000 MKD	** ,44	,16	1,56	1,138	2,129
4. Over 20,000 MKD	** ,56	,16	1,75	1,274	2,403
Second step					
Neighbor benevolence (-)					
1. inconsistent answer	*-,25	,12	,78	,61	,985
2. (+)	-,27	,16	,76	,56	1,040
Possibility to influence	** ,20	,06	1,22	1,09	1,370
Will for involvement (-)					
1. inconsistent answer	,15	,12	1,16	,91	1,477
2. (+)	** ,55	,13	1,74	1,35	2,248
Level of organization of the community	** ,27	,08	1,31	1,13	1,514
Belonging	-,06	,09	,94	,79	1,109
Satisfaction with the place of residence	**-,25	,08	,78	,66	,915
Evaluating the changes (+)					
1. (-)	-,24	,13	,79	,61	1,022
2. inconsistent answer	**-,36	,12	,70	,56	,880
Voting behaviour	** ,38	,06	1,46	1,29	1,657
Membership in organizations (+)	**1,04	,11	2,84	2,28	3,543

Note: B = regression coefficient;

S,E = standard error; OR = odds ratio

* p < .05, ** p < .01,

When the sociodemographic variables and the year of research are controlled, the participation in contact activism can significantly be predicted from: one's own confidence to influence, the will for involvement in the community, the assessments of its level of organizations, the consistency in the voting behaviour, the satisfaction with the place of residence and the membership in organizations, clubs and groups. As expected, the likelihood to contact representatives of the public institutions is higher among those who are more convinced they can have influence, and in fact with an increase of one unit on the scale of trust in one own's political efficiency, the odds for contact activism increase by 1.22.

The will for involvement also occur as a significant predictor, and according to the findings, the activism odds ratio is 1.35 times higher among those who said that improving society is a personal responsibility and expressed will for involvement, in comparison to those who gave a negative answer to these two questions.

The attitude towards the level of organization of one's neighbors or the community for civic initiatives, also predicts this type of activism, increasing the odds of communicating with the representatives of the public institutions and the government among those who assess the level of organization of the community as higher. The evaluation of changes also occurs as a significant predictor, yet according to the findings, those who positively evaluated both the changes in Macedonia and in their own town, are significantly different only from those who gave an inconsistent answer and among whom the chances for participation are significantly lower.

The consistency in the voting behaviour is also a significant predictor, which is particularly understandable if it is taken into consideration that both contact activism and voting at the elections are forms of conventional civic engagement which are tied to the institutionally-defined mechanisms for influence over the political processes.

The satisfaction with one's place of residence negatively predicts the engagement with contact activism which suggests and more dissatisfied citizens contact the elected representatives and the representatives of the public institutions more often. Finally, the probability of practicing contact activism is higher among those who are members of organizations, clubs or groups.

Predicting constructive activism

The model in which only the sociodemographic variables and the year of research are entered is significant $\chi^2(22) = 174,030, p = .000$, and explains between 6 (Cox & Snell $R^2 = 0,66$) and 9 (Nagelkerke $R^2 = .096$) percent of the variance in constructive activism. The Hosmer–Lemeshow test for goodness of fit is insignificant, which additionally indicates that the model is good $\chi^2(8) = 9,985, p = ,266$. The model in which the aggregate variables are also entered, apart from the sociodemographic variables and the year of research, is also significant $\chi^2(35) = 409,473, p = .000$ and explains between 16 (Cox & Snell $R^2 = .164,17$), and 21 (Nagelkerke $R^2 = .2151$) percent of the variance in constructive activism. Once again, the Hosmer–Lemeshow test for goodness of fit is insignificant, $\chi^2(8) = 8,114, p = ,422$.

In table 39 we have the values for the regression coefficients, the odds ratio and their 95% confidence intervals, based on which we can assess the specific predictive value of each of the input variables.

TABLE 39. PREDICTING CONSTRUCTIVE ACTIVISM

Predictor:	B	S.E.	OR	95% CI OR	
First step					
Year (2013)					
1. 2014	,22	,13	1,25	,97	1,61
2. 2015	-,10	,14	,90	,69	1,18
3. 2016	-,14	,13	,87	,67	1,14
Age groups (youth)					
	**-,36	,12	,70	,56	,88
Education (primary)					
1. Secondary education	*,34	,16	1,41	1,03	1,93
2. University education	**-,84	,18	2,32	1,64	3,30
Ethnicity (Macedonians)					
	,23	,15	1,26	,95	1,68
Sex (Men)					
	**-,60	,10	1,83	1,51	2,21
Place of residence (village)					
1. Skopje	**-,71	,23	,49	,31	,77
2. Another town	**-,64	,12	,53	,42	,67
Status on the labour market (employed)					
	-,07	,12	,94	,75	1,17
Region (Skopje)					
1. Vardar	-,25	,27	,78	,46	1,31
2. East	-,02	,25	,98	,60	1,60
3. Southwest	-,18	,24	,84	,52	1,34
4. Southeast	-,46	,26	,63	,38	1,05
5. Pelagonija	-,03	,23	,97	,61	1,53
6. Polog	-,20	,24	,82	,51	1,32
7. Northeast	-,15	,26	,86	,51	1,43
Monthly income (up to 5 thousand MKD)					
1. From 5,000 to 10,000 MKD	-,18	,16	,84	,62	1,14
2. From 10,000 to 15,000 MKD	,22	,16	1,25	,92	1,69
3. From 15,000 to 20,000 MKD	,34	,17	1,40	,99	1,97
4. Over 20,000 MKD	**-,56	,17	1,76	1,25	2,47
Second step					
Neighbor benevolence (-)					
1. inconsistent answer	-,08	,13	,92	,71	1,19
2. (+)	-,27	,18	,76	,54	1,07
Possibility to influence					
	**-,28	,06	1,32	1,17	1,50
Will for involvement (-)					
1. inconsistent answer	**-,62	,15	1,87	1,39	2,51

Predictor:	B	S.E.	OR	95% CI OR	
2. (+)	**,.86	,16	2,36	1,74	3,19
Level of organization of the community	**,.26	,08	1,30	1,11	1,52
Belonging	-,18	,09	,84	,70	1,00
Satisfaction with the place of residence	-,09	,09	,92	,76	1,10
Evaluating the changes (+)					
1. (-)	,05	,15	1,06	,79	1,40
2. inconsistent answer	-,09	,13	,92	,71	1,18
Voting behaviour	,10	,07	1,10	,97	1,26
Membership in organizations (+)	**1,16	,11	3,20	2,56	4,00

Note: B = regression coefficient;
S,E = standard error; OR = odds ratio
* p <.05, **p <.01.

Similarly to contact activism, constructive activism can also be significantly predicted by: the confidence in one's own ability to influence, the will for involvement, the assessments of the level of organization of the community for civic initiatives, the consistency in the voting behaviour and the membership in organizations and clubs.

The chances for collective participation, i.e. participation in public groups, hearings, or submitting proposals and complaints to the public institutions, similarly to contact activism, increase with the increase in the trust in one's own political efficiency, increase in the confidence the neighbor's level of organization and the consistency of the voting behaviour. The likelihood for constructive activism is higher among those who had expressed inclination for greater involvement and the odds for engagement are 2.56 higher among those who are members of organizations, clubs and groups.

Predicting hostile activism

The model in which only the sociodemographic variables and the year of research are entered is significant $\chi^2(22) = 163,729, p = .000$, and explains between 6 (Cox & Snell $R^2 = 0,66$) and 9 (Nagelkerke $R^2 = .093$) percent of the variance in contact activism. The Hosmer–Lemeshow test for goodness of fit is insignificant, which additionally confirms that the model is good. $\chi^2(8) = 3,189, p = ,922$. The model in which the aggregate variables are also entered, apart from the sociodemographic variables and the year of research, is also significant $\chi^2(35) = 435,450, p = .000$, and explains between 15 (Cox & Snell $R^2 = .154$), and 23 (Nagelkerke $R^2 = .234$) percent of the variance in hostile activism. Once again, the Hosmer–Lemeshow test for goodness of fit is insignificant $\chi^2(8) = 10,522, p = ,230$, which indicates that the model is adequate.

In table 40 we have the values for the regression coefficients, the odds ratio and their 95% confidence intervals, based on which we can assess the specific predictive value of each of the input variables.

TABLE 40. PREDICTING HOSTILE ACTIVISM

Predictor:	B	S.E.	OR	95% CI OR	
First step					
Year (2013)					
1. 2014	,02	,14	1,02	,77	1,35
2. 2015	**,.44	,14	1,56	1,19	2,04
3. 2016	,23	,14	1,26	,96	1,66
Age groups (youth)					
Education (primary)					
1. Secondary education	,28	,17	1,33	,95	1,87
2. University education	**,.77	,19	2,16	1,49	3,13
Ethnicity (Macedonians)					
Sex (Men)					
Place of residence (village)					
1. Skopje	,41	,23	1,51	,96	2,39
2. Another town	,19	,13	1,21	,94	1,56
Status on the labour market (employed)					
Region (Skopje)					
1. Vardar	-,47	,28	,62	,36	1,07
2. East	-,51	,27	,60	,36	1,01
3. Southwest	-,44	,26	,64	,39	1,06
4. Southeast	*-,56	,27	,57	,33	,97
5. Pelagonija	-,23	,24	,80	,49	1,28
6. Polog	-,12	,25	,89	,54	1,44
7. Northeast	*-,64	,28	,53	,30	,92
Monthly income (up to 5 thousand MKD)					
1. From 5,000 to 10,000 MKD	-,06	,16	,95	,70	1,28
2. From 10,000 to 15,000 MKD	-,04	,16	,96	,70	1,32
3. From 15,000 to 20,000 MKD	-,06	,19	,94	,65	1,35
4. Over 20,000 MKD	,28	,18	1,32	,92	1,88
Second step					
Neighbor benevolence (-)					
1. inconsistent answer	-,26	,14	,77	,59	1,01
2. (+)	-,17	,18	,84	,60	1,19
Possibility to influence					
Will for involvement (-)					
1. inconsistent answer	**,.83	,16	2,30	1,67	3,16

Predictor:	B	S.E.	OR	95% CI OR	
2. (+)	**,.98	,17	2,67	1,92	3,72
Level of organization of the community	*,22	,09	1,24	1,05	1,48
Belonging	*-,22	,09	,81	,67	,97
Satisfaction with the place of residence	*-,22	,10	,80	,66	,96
Evaluating the changes (+)					
1. (-)	**,.77	,15	2,17	1,61	2,91
2. inconsistent answer	,02	,14	1,02	,77	1,36
Voting behaviour	**,.22	,07	1,25	1,09	1,43
Membership in organizations (+)	**1,20	,12	3,33	2,65	4,19

Note: B = regression coefficient;
S,E = standard error; OR = odds ratio
* p <.05, **p <.01.

Unlike the previous two forms of activism, which in essence mainly rely to cooperation with the institutions, the assessment of changes plays a significant role when predicting hostile activism. The changes for hostile activism are 2.17 times higher among those who assessed a deterioration, in contrast to those who believe that things have improved in their place of residence.

Consistently with the patterns of relations that were established for the previous two forms of activism, the likelihood for participation in protests and signing petitions increases with the increase of the assessment of the level of organization of the community for civic initiatives and with the increase in the consistency of the voting behaviour. The odds for hostile activism are twice (2.67) higher among those who have expressed will for involvement in comparison to those who refuse to get involved, while membership in organizations, clubs and groups increases the chances for hostile activism by more than three times (3.33).

It is worth noting that unlike the previous types of activism, in order to predict hostile activism, the prominence of the sense of belonging to the place of residence is significant, yet it can be concluded that the likelihood to engage in hostile activism increases with the decrease in the sense of belonging or identification with one's place of residence.



Conclusions

Consistently with the model for general incentives (Whiteley & Seyd, 1998; Whiteley & Seyd, 1996) and the model for civic volunteerism (Verba et al., 1995; Brady et al., 1995; Parry et al., 1992) which emphasize that the perceptions of political efficiency are significant determinants of the level of participation, the engagement in civic initiatives and the engagement in contact and constructive activism can significantly be predicted by the confidence in one's own power to influence. If the likelihood of civic participation and engagement in activism mediated by the institutions increases with the increase of the confidence in the political efficiency of citizens to affect the decision-making processes on a national and local level, the fact that the predominant perception of practical marginalization in the decision-making processes also reflects on the low level of participation in the period between 2012 and 2016 should not be surprising. Most of the citizens, or, an average of two out of three for all the years of research (68.2%) are convinced that they are unable to affect the decisions about Macedonia, and as many as 72.9% of the citizens who believe that are unable to influence the decisions about the country, believe that they are unable to influence the decisions within their municipality, although the possibility to get involved in the decision-making processes of the local government should be more accessible. We can only speculate about the causality between the attitudes on the power to influence, civic activism and participation in initiatives for the common good, but the consistency of the findings suggests that one of the possible reasons for the low representation is the dominant belief about their ineffectiveness. The possibilities to influence, according to the respondents' answers, are "closed" to the citizens and therefore civic engagement in order to intervene in the political processes is futile.

The findings that the assessments of the neighbors' level of organizations significantly predict personal engagement are in line with the model on general incentives (Whiteley & Seyd, 1998; Whiteley & Seyd, 1996), which stresses the importance of social norms in supporting civic engagement. In addition, from the five-year breakdown of trends in this comparative analysis, it appears that the reporting on one's own participation is consistent with the perceptions of civic engagement within the community. In fact, in 2014 a relative increase in the average assessments of the level of organization for civic initiatives of fellow-citizens was observed (on the level of both town/village and on the level of Macedonia) and in that year, the percentage of citizens who had taken part in civic initiatives also had its relative peak, along with the percentage of citizens who had engaged in contact and constructive activism. The synchronization in the trends of the perception of the fellow-citizens' engagement and the personal participation in civic initiatives serves as additional validation of the findings as a representation of the social reality, but it can also serve to suggest that the individual engagement in civic initiatives and cooperative civic activism is supported by the perceptions of collective engagement for social change.

The confidence in the ability to influence the decision-making process on both local and national level, although essential to the engagement in civic initiatives and in the forms of activism which necessarily assume collaboration with the institutions, according to the findings of the regressive analysis, are irrelevant for the engagement in hostile or confrontational activism. As it was previously stated, unlike the cooperative forms of activism, when it comes to hostile activism, the evaluation of the changes that have taken place plays a key role (from the considered constructs). In fact, the engagement in hostile activism, above all, by participating in protests or demonstrations, undergoes

an increase in 2015, coupled with a significant drop in the likelihood of assessing changes for the better in both Macedonia and the towns/villages, as well as the level of satisfaction with the work of the local government.

At the same time, as it was previously stated (see graph 27), the increase in hostile activism runs parallel with the decline in the cooperative forms of activism based on contacting institutions and taking part in the activities organized by them (e.g. working groups, public hearings), which may indicate that when the cooperation with the institutions fails, the only instrument of influence are the activities expressing resistance which serve as a vent for the accumulated dissatisfaction. Although there is a lower connection, as it was previously stated, the increase in the likelihood of hostile activism, is coupled with a decline in the sense of belonging on one's place of residence, which may indicate that the resistance and confronting are also manifested by relative de-identification with one's community, although this conclusion is too ambitious if it is taken into consideration that despite the fact that the sense of belonging to the immediate communities and Macedonia significantly drops in the period between 2012 and 2016, on average two thirds, or 67.94% of the citizens feel a strong sense of belonging to their country, while somewhat less (58.04%), yet still over half of them, feel a strong sense of belonging to their towns/villages.

The membership into organizations, clubs and groups as a prerequisite for formal volunteering, increases the likelihood of participation in civic initiatives and engagement in any of the three forms of civic activism, which is consistent with the theoretization about social capital (Putnam, 1993, 2001) and the findings which suggest that membership and volunteering in organizations increase the confidence in one's own political efficiency (Joslyn & Cigler, 2001), as well as the likelihood of political action by contacting the representatives of the public institutions, boycotting or signing petitions (Jenkins, Andolina, Keeter, & Zukin, 2003). The findings are an indication that the social capital created by the local organizations, groups and clubs can also turn into civic activism, suggesting a relationship of overlapping between the conditionally speaking apolitical and political forms of civic engagement.

Finally, we can notice that the will for involvement which assumes personal responsibility for a social change and the inclination for increased involvement in the decision-making processes on a local level, significantly predict both the engagement in civic initiatives and the practicing of all three forms of activism, which is in line with the self-evident assumptions of the model for civic voluntarism (Verba et al., 1995; Brady et al., 1995; Parry et al., 1992).

According to Coffé & Bolzendahl (2010): "The systematic and persistent patterns of unequal participation along existing lines of stratification, [...], are threats to both political equality and democratic performance" (p.319). In context of the predictions for stratification of civic engagement (Uslaner & Brown, 2005, Verba et al., 1995), the findings still suggest that the differences are most consistent along the lines of gender and the level of education. The gender discrepancies in the participation in the more conventional forms of political activism, such as contact and constructive activism, are statistically significant during all the years of research in the period from 2012 to 2016, even when the other sociodemographic variables, such as education and income are controlled. Consistently with the data on the gender gap in the representation in public and political offices (Korunovska Avramovska, Korunovska Srbijanko & Ilikj, 2015), according to the findings of this five-year study, women are the ones who engage in communication with the elected officials and representatives

significantly less, and are significantly less a part of the activities organized by public institutions (e.g. working groups, public hearings). Although this consistency imposes an unpleasant conclusion that the opportunities for access to the instruments of influence are unequal to the genders, the findings that these differences are less prominent among the younger respondents do give some hope - when the other sociodemographic variables are controlled, among the citizens younger than 29, when it comes to their engagement in constructive activism, the gender differences are not statistically significant in 2013 and 2016, while when it comes to their engagement in contact activism, these differences are only significant in 2012.

Consistently with the model of civic voluntarism, (Verba et al., 1995; Brady et al., 1995; Parry et al., 1992), according to the study results, those who are better educated more often engage in all three types of civic activism during all of the years of research, which unequivocally indicates that formal education is an important resource for civic engagement (Nie, Junn & Stehlik-Barry, 1996), although some authors (Galston, 2007; Ngagement, Ducation, & Galston, 2001) advocate "specialized" civic education which would make it possible to the citizens to more effectively translate their individual and groups interests into the public policies.

In the context of the findings from this study, it would not be completely justified to speak about an erosion of civic engagement among the youth, and it would be more adequate to conclude that the youth are not disinterested in civic engagement, but that they have alternative means for it. Although there are differences in the level of engagement, it would be desirable to interpret them within the context of the differences in the modes of participation among the cohorts (Bennett, et al., 2007; Dejaeghere & Hooghe, 2009; Jois & Toppe, 2005). The youth comparatively more rarely engage in the electoral forms of participation and in the activism mediated by the state mechanisms, yet in the past two years they have been involved in hostile, or confrontational activism significantly more than their older fellow-citizens, particularly by participating in protests. In 2015, when the rate of hostile activism significantly grew, 36.94% of the citizens younger than 29 engaged in this type of activism, in contrast to 22.22% of the older respondents. On the other hand, the rate of contact activism in both age groups is reverse, and in comparison, in 2015, a third (33.33%) of the citizens older than 29 were involved in contact activism, in contrast to a quarter (24.62%) of their younger fellow-citizens.

However, the five-year breakdown of the attitudes of the youth does give a cause for concern. In 2012, 68.42% of the citizens younger than 29 felt a strong sense of belonging to Macedonia, while in 2016, this percentage dropped to 43.23%. As expected, the decline in the sense of belonging is actualized through an increase in the frequency of the intention for migration, and the data which indicate that in 2013 38.65% of the youth expressed desire to migrate out of their country in the following 5 years, while in 2016 this percentage increases 51.9%, is devastating, alarming us that more than half of the citizens younger than 29 plan to move out of their country in the next 5 years.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ajzen, I. (1988). *Attitudes, Personality and Behavior*. England: Milton–Keynes Open University Press & Chicago, IL: Dorsey Press.
- Ajzen, I. (1991). The Theory of Planned Behavior. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 50, 179–211.
- Bennett, W. L., Wells, C., & Rank, A. (2007). *Young Citizens and Civic Learning: Two Paradigms of Citizenship in the Digital Age*. Seattle, WA: Center for Communication and Civic Engagement, University of Washington.
- Blais, A., Gidengil, E., & Nevitte, N. (2004). Where does turnout decline come from? [Article]. *European Journal of Political Research*, 43(2), 221–236. doi: 10.1111/j.1475–6765.2004.00152.x
- Brady, H. E., Verba, S., & Schlozman, K. L. (1995). Beyond SES: A resource model of political participation. *American Political Science Review*, 89(02), 271–294.
- Coffé, H., & Bolzendahl, C. (2010). Same game, different rules? gender differences in political participation. *Sex Roles*, 62(5–6), 318–333. <http://doi.org/10.1007/s11199-009-9729-y>
- Cohen, E. F. (2005). Neither Seen Nor Heard: Children’s Citizenship in Contemporary Democracies. *Citizenship Studies*, 9(2), 221–240.
- Dejaeghere, Y., & Hooghe, M. (2009). Brief report: Citizenship concepts among adolescents. Evidence from a survey among Belgian 16–year olds. *J Adolesc*, 32(3), 723–732.
- Dekker, P., & Van den Broeck, A. (1998). Civil Society in Comparative Perspective: Involvement in Voluntary Associations in North America and Western Europe. *Voluntas*, 9(1), 11–38. <http://doi.org/10.1023/a:1021450828183>
- Downs, A. (1957). *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper & Row.
- EC. (2013). *European Youth: Participation in Democratic Life*. Brussels: European Commission.
- Ehrlich, T., (Ed.). (2000). *Civic Responsibility and Higher Education*. Westport, CT: Oryx Press.
- Espirova, N., Ray, J., & Pugliese, A. (2011). Gallup World Poll: The Many Faces of Global Migration. Geneva: International Organization for Migration.
- Franklin, M. N. (2004). *Voter Turnout and the Dynamics of Electoral Competition in Established Democracies since 1945*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gallup. (2011, 02.01.2013). Civic Engagement Highest in Developed Countries: People less likely to volunteer time than donate money, help stranger, available at: <http://www.gallup.com/poll/145589/civic-engagement-highest-developed-countries.aspx#1>
- Gallup. (2014). Potential Net Migration Index Declines in Many Countries, available at: <http://www.gallup.com/poll/166796/potential-net-migration-index-declines-countries.aspx>
- Gallup. (2016). *Global Civic Engagement*. Retrieved from <http://www.gallup.com/195686/2016-global-civic-engagement-report.aspx>
- Harris, A., Wyn, J., & Younes, S. (2010). Beyond apathetic or activist youth ‘Ordinary’ young people and contemporary forms of participation. [Article]. *Young*, 18(1), 9–32. doi: 10.1177/110330880901800103
- ILO. (2008). Manual on the Measurement of Volunteer Work, *Chapter 5 of Report I, General Report to the ICLS* Geneva, Switzerland: International Labour Organization.
- ILO. (2011). Youth employment in Eastern Europe: Crisis within the crisis Geneva.
- Jenkins, K., Andolina, M. W., Keeter, S., & Zukin, C. (2003, April). Is civic behavior political? Exploring the multidimensional nature of political participation. In *annual conference of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago*.
- Jois, G. U., & Toppe, C. M. (2005). Civic Engagement among American Youth: Research, Activism, and Democracy. *Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action*. Washington, DC
- Joslyn, M. R., & Cigler, A. (2001). Group involvement and democratic orientations: Social capital in the postelection context. *Social Science Quarterly*, 82(2), 357–368. <http://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/0038-4941.00028>

- Kimberlee, R. H. (2002). Why Don't British Young People Vote at General Elections? *Journal of Youth Studies*, 5(1), 85–98. doi:10.1080/13676260120111788
- Korunovska Avramovska, N. (2012). Parliamentary Control over the Government of the Republic of Macedonia (pp. 113). Skopje: Foundation Open Society – Macedonia.
- Korunovska Avramovska, N., Korunovska Srbijanko, J. & Ilikj, S. (2015). Women in politics: Paths to public office and impact at the local level in Macedonia. Reactor – Research in Action
- Korunovska Srbijanko, J., Korunovska Avramovska, N., & Maleska, T. (2011). *Capitulation, Confusion or Resistance: Social Capital among Macedonian High-School Students*. Skopje Youth Educational Forum.
- Korunovska Srbijanko, J., Korunovska Avramovska, N., & Maleska, T. (2012a). Predicting Youth Apathy and Exclusion: Macedonian High-School Students and Their Relations to Their Communities. [Original article]. *Sociologija*, 54(2), 333–350. doi: DOI:10.2298/SOC1202333K
- Korunovska Srbijanko, J., Korunovska Avramovska, N., & Maleska, T. (2012b). *Youth and the Labor Market*. Skopje: REACTOR Research in Action
- Korunovska Srbijanko, J., Korunovska Avramovska, N., & Maleska, T. (2013). The “Getting Nowhere” Generation: The Transition of Unemployed Youth in Transitional Macedonia. In C. Gordon, M. Kmezic & J. Opardija (Eds.), *Stagnation and drift in the Western Balkans: the challenges of political, economic and social change*. (Vol. 10). Pieterlen: Peter Lang AG.
- Kovacheva, S. (2000). Keys to Youth Participation in Eastern Europe. Strasbourg: Directorate of Youth and Sport. Council of Europe.
- Lenzi, M., Vieno, A., Perkins, D. D., Santinello, M., Elgar, F. J., Morgan, A., & Mazzardis, S. (2012). Family Affluence, School and Neighborhood Contexts and Adolescents' Civic Engagement: A Cross-National Study. [Article]. *American Journal of Community Psychology*, 50(1–2), 197–210. doi:10.1007/s10464-012-9489-7
- Lerner, R. M. (2004). *Liberty: Thriving and Civic Engagement among America's Youth*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Lim, C., & Sander, T. (2013). Does misery love company? Civic engagement in economic hard times. *Social Science Research*, 42(1), 14–30. doi: available at: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2012.07.004>
- Lyons, W., & Alexander, R. (2000). A Tale of Two Electorates: Generational Replacement and the Decline of Voting in Presidential Elections. *Journal of Politics*, 62(4), 1014–1034. <http://doi.org/10.1111/0022-3816.00044>
- Mondak, J. J., & Gearing, A. F. (1998). Civic engagement in a post-communist state. [Article]. *Political Psychology*, 19(3), 615–637. doi:10.1111/0162-895x.00121
- O'Toole, T., Lister, M., Marsh, D., Jones, S., & McDonagh, A. (2003). Turning out or Left Out? Participation and Nonparticipation Among Young People. *Contemporary Politics*, 9(1), 45–61.
- Olson, M. (1965). *The logic of collective action*. New York: Schocken Books.
- Parry, G., Moyser, G., & Day, N. (1992). *Political participation and democracy in Britain*. Cambridge University Press.
- Pattie, C., & Johnston, R. (1998). Voter turnout at the British general election of 1992: Rational choice, social standing or political efficacy? *European Journal of Political Research*, 33(2), 263–283. <http://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.00383>
- Pattie, C., Seyd, P., & Whiteley, P. (2003). Citizenship and Civic Engagement: Attitudes and Behaviour in Britain. *Political Studies*, 51(3), 443–468+609. <http://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.00435>
- Pattie, C., Seyd, P., & Whiteley, P. (2004). *Citizenship in Britain: Values, participation and democracy*. Cambridge University Press.
- Pippa, N., (Ed.). (1999). *Critical Citizens Global Support for Democratic Government*. Oxford: 'Oxford University Press'.
- Putnam, R. D. (1993). *Making democracy work. Civil traditions in modern Italy*. Princeton University Press. <http://doi.org/10.2307/2620793>
- Putnam, R. (2001). Social capital: Measurement and consequences. *Canadian Journal of Policy Research*, 2(1), 41–51.
- Theiss-Morse, E., & Hibbing, J. R. (2005). Citizenship and Civic Engagement. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 8(1), 227–249. <http://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.8.082103.104829>

- UNDP. (2012a). Enhancing Youth Political Participation throughout the Electoral Cycle. New York City: United Nations Development Programme.
- UNDP. (2012b). Youth, Political Participation and Decision-Making [Fact Sheet]. New York City: United Nations Development Programme.
- Uslaner, E. M., & Brown, M. (2005). Inequality, trust, and civic engagement. *American Politics Research*, 33(6), 868–894. <http://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X04271903>
- Verba, S., Scholzman, K. L. and Brady, H. E., (1995). Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Whiteley, P. F. (2000). Economic Growth and Social Capital. *Political Studies*, 48(3), 443–466. <http://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.00269>
- Whiteley, P. F., & Seyd, P. (1998). The Dynamics of Party Activism in Britain: A Spiral of Demobilization? *British Journal of Political Science*, 28(1), 113–137. <http://doi.org/10.1017/S000712349800012X>
- Whitely, P. F., & Seyd, P. (1996). Rationality and party activism: Encompassing tests of alternative models of political participation. *European Journal of Political Research*, 29(2), 215–234. Retrieved from <http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1475-6765.1996.tb00649.x>
- World Bank. (2011a). Migration and remittances data from the World Bank, available at: <http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPROSPECTS/0,,contentMDK:22759429~pagePK:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:476883,00.html>
- World Bank. (2011b). Migration and Remittances Factbook (2nd ed.). Washington World Bank.
- Youniss, J., McLellan, J. A., Su, Y., & Yates, M. (1999). The Role of Community Service in Identity Development: Normative, Unconventional, and Deviant Orientations. *Journal of Adolescent Research*, 14(2), 248–261. doi: 10.1177/0743558499142006
- Zaff, J., Boyd, M., Li, Y., Lerner, J. V., & Lerner, R. M. (2010). Active and Engaged Citizenship: Multi-group and Longitudinal Factorial Analysis of an Integrated Construct of Civic Engagement. *J Youth Adolesc*, 39(7), 736–750.
- Zaff, J., & Michelsen, E. (2001). Background for Community - Level Work on Positive Citizenship among Adolescents: A Review of Antecedents, Programs, and Investment Strategies *Child Trends*. Washington, DC: John S. and James L. Knight Foundation.
- ДЗС. (2009). Анкета за користење на времето. Скопје: Државен завод за статистика.
- ДЗС. (2012). Процени на населението на 30.06.2011 и 31.12.2011 според полот и возраста по општини и по статистички региони (нтес 3 – 2007 година). Преземено во јуни 2012 година, од Државен завод за статистика на Република Македонија, достапно на: <http://www.stat.gov.mk/Publikacii/2.4.12.08.pdf>
- ДЗС. (2013а). Процени на населението на 30.06.2012 и 31.12.2012 според полот и возраста, по општини и по статистички региони (нтес 3 – 2007 година) *Статистички преглед: Население и социјални статистики* (Vol. 757). Скопје: Државен завод за статистика
- ДЗС. (2013б). Статистичка база на податоци, достапно на: <http://makstat.stat.gov.mk/pjweb2007bazi/Dialog/statfile1.asp>
- Клековски, С., Јаковлеска, Г., & Стојанова, Д. (2011). Општествена одговорност на граѓаните. Скопје, Македонија: Македонски центар за меѓународна соработка.
- Клековски, С., Кржаловски, А., & Јаковлеска, Г. (2007). Општествена одговорност на граѓаните. Скопје: Македонски центар за меѓународна соработка.
- Клековски, С., Кржаловски, А., Саздовска, С., Јаковлеска, Г., Колиќ, М., & Стојанова, Д. (2009). Општествена одговорност на граѓаните. Скопје, Македонија: Македонски центар за меѓународна соработка.
- Клековски, С., Стојанова, Д., Јаковлеска, Г., & Нурединоска, Е. (2011). Долг пат до поголем граѓански ангажман. Скопје: Македонски центар за меѓународна соработка.
- МТСП. (2010). Стратегија за промовирање и развој на волонтерството (2010 – 2015) и план за спроведување (акциски план). Скопје, Македонија: Министерство за труд и социјална политика.
- ЦИРа. (2006). Истражување за развој на филантропијата во Република Македонија. Скопје, Македонија: ЦИРа.

